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ABSTRACT 
The need to attempt some type of control on the cost of medical 
care has become r8ther generally accepted. Wheat heasn·t been eagreed 
upon is how thl s wi 11 be done I n the long term. The current means of 
attempting control without the need of significant government 
i nterYent ion is the pro-compet I t lYe enyl ronment whi ch is i nl t i at i ng 
sweepi ng changes .. eand is showi ng some eearl y promi se of reduci ng the 
rapl di ty of medi ca 1 cost i ncreease. Prepai d medi cal care is bel ng 
emphasi zed eas ho 1 di ng the key to thi s problem. I n these systems we 
are relying on the physician to be both provider and rationer of care 
whi 1 e ent it li ng the patient to eall -necesseary- medi cal ceare. The 
peatients have for meany yeears been conditioned by the mediceal system 
to ea perception of necesseary medical care. The mediceal profession .. 
however .. is not eas readily able to define necesseary care .. but has been 
gi yen the responsi bil i ty to de Ii yer it. As these new systems i ncreease .. 
an adYersarial role is developing between doctor and patient. From 
the vantage point of neearly 25 yeears as ea feamily physician .. studying 
the response of patient eand proyi der to the I ncent i yes of the system; 
the author has formulated a unique system of medical ceare financing. 
This system will employ a voucher concept .. cost-effective incentives 
built in to the reimbursement structure for both physician and 
peat i ent. It proyi des for a maxi mum of pat lent choi ce eas the patient 
and his physician work as a partnership to define and obtain 
necessary medi cal care. Thi s concept is exp I ai ned; 1 Og1 c for f ts 
theoretical basis is given. It is analyzed from the standpofnt of the 
principles of the Health Policy Agenda for the American People and in 
view of the cost containment and health policy literature. Some 
suggestions of possible appro8ches to implementation are also m8de. 
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I NTRODUeT lOR 
SctItNIrioMIJ:A young physician" establishing his practice" was 
excited et the prospect of e private practice. His experience as a 
ml1itary physician had given him valuable training" but the ·system· 
hed its frustrations. Now he was a real docton One of his early 
patients was a young man wi th a nose inJury. Remembert ng the 
excellent instruction of hts Ear" Nose" and Throet Chief" a thorough 
exam wes done. A minor fracture was suspected but there was no 
cosmetic or functional impairment. It would not be necessary to 
x-ray at this time" the doctor explained" pleased that he could spare 
the young man that expense. Detailed instruction of cere and a 
follow-up appointment were given. 
Leter the doctor finished up some office detens and turned his 
steps to the hospi ta 1 across the street for eveni ng rounds. As he 
pessed the x-rey depertment" to his surprise" -the Injured nose- wes 
there getting x-rayed. Upon inquiring our doctor learned that he had 
failed to sense that his petient hed felt the care delivered was 
inadequate for the lack of an x-ray. Dr .• p." an older and ·wiser-
physician" hDd been consulted and the desired x-ray ordered. Our 
espl ring young doctor hed lost e pet i ent in spi te of del i yen ng 
excel1ent" economical cere. He reviewed 1n his mind the detens of 
the case and sttll concluded that an x-ray was not medically 
necessary" but surmised that there must be other indications for 
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x-ray which Dr .• p. understood. Economic Indications? What should 
he do next time he saw a patient with a nose injury, get an x-ray? He 
might as well, everybody else does end the patient's insurance will 
PlY for it. His conscience bothered him for a whUe, but soon he 
became I nsensl t I ve to the unnecessary costs he was generating. 
After all, It is essential to please the patient or you won't have a 
successful practice. 
5ceMrlo twa' A young mother, upon concluding her visit at the 
pediatrician's office, was told by the receptionist that she surely 
came in frequently. ·Oh, I have to·, was her reply, ·You see, I pay 
$80.00 (only one-third of total) per month for medical insurance, and 
this is the only way I can get my money's worth'-
5ceMrlo thrett A concerned f amll y doctor spoke one dey to a 
consultant about what appeared to be an excessive charge for such a 
brief consultation. There was also concern about a $40.00 charge for 
interpreting an x-ray, for which the radiologist had also charged. The 
consultant seemed quite taken back at the concern of the fam11y 
doctor and repll ed, ·Why are you concerned? The insurance pays for 
It.-
5ceMrlo f/JtJl':' A doctor new to the communi ty became concerned 
about a policy of the major Insurance carrier. The insurance company 
would reimburse the physician In his office for only the professional 
fee In doing a laceration repair, requiring that he provide suture, tray, 
and dressing. In the hospital emergency room, however, the tray, 
suture, end an emergency room fee was all paid, In addition to the 
professional fee. As a result, most trauma wes being sent to the 
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hospital where excessive costs were being genenated. This physicican 
hid occasion one day to Yistt with the president of the Insurance 
company and explained his concern about the policy. ·Yes,· the 
president said, ·we haye got to get off that one and change the pollcy.-
Howeyer, to the dismay of the young doctor, ten years later the same 
po 1 Icy existed. 
5c8JNJrio fit'll A muscular, robust teen-agar In P.E. class col1ided 
with his heed against another stoutly bunt fenow and fel1 to the 
floor unconscious for a brief moment. In the hospital emergency room 
he wes evaluated and because of the ·hospltal policy· he was 
admitted. The attending doctor ordered vital signs and neurological 
checks hourly for four hours until he could reevaluate. The doctor 
was then informed that because hourly yltal signs were ordered hi s 
patient would need to be in I.C.U. The nurses would be too busy to 
take hourly yltal signs. It was ·hospltal poHcy.- It was explained to 
the mother that the doctor did not feel an I.C.U. bed was needed and 
would incur unnecessary expense. The mother said" ·My insurance will 
pay for it.-
5c8JNJrio SiN: A genial man In the hospital preparing for surgery 
was examl ned by a cardio 1 ogt st at the request of the surgeon. The 
consultation was very brief end cursory, but the charges were 
hea 1 thy_ Upon recel vi ng the bill our genl a I patient became 1 ess so. 
His concern that the consultant had not given service commensurate 
wi th the charges was expressed to the 1 nsurance company, but the 
insurance company paid the consultant in full against the protests of 
the pat lent. 
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ScttINJrio S8WJ1!. The petient wes e mother of fiye children in her 
mid forties, obyiously terminel with rnetestic cerci nome of the 
ceecum. Her lungs were full of lerge golf bell sized lesions. Ascites 
wes so extensiye es to present the eppeerance of e multiple 
pregnency. Peln wes seyere, requinng frequent nercotic injections. 
An ettempt et chemotherapy et the neerby uniyersity hospltel hed not 
eltered the course of her cencer end she wes et home with the obvious 
IneYlteblllty of deeth. Vomiting ensued end e doctor Yisited et the 
home di egnosing a bowel obstruction. It was stated by the physicien 
thet surgery would heye to be done to reHeye the obstruction. A 
hospital edmlsslon wes erronged, a surgeon obtained, and surgery 
eccompl1shed. In the course of the surgery e cordiec erTest wes noted 
end successful resuscitetton wes done. A respiretor wes employed. 
With that mechanical support she was able to withstand the stroke 
thet soon ensued. Some two weeks later, heylng hed essentielly no 
communi cet i on wi th her f ami 1 y dun ng the termt ne 1 ill ness, she dt ed. 
In the meantime she had suffered more then her suffering would haye 
been hed she been treeted conservet i ye 1 y, and 1 et the bowel 
obstruction be the terminal eyent, ntther then the Iatrogenically 
induced dlseese. The final hosp1tel bill must have been near $30,000. 
The physicians involved felt they were doing everything possible to 
seve her Ufe. Others would ha~e Ylewed this as a cese of prolonging 
her death, increasing suffering, end a misallocatton of scerce 
resources. 
Sc8tNJrioeight"A 17 yeer old boy ,whose famtly was recelYlng 
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welfare assistance, hed a past history of a cleft pelate and here Up, 
expertly repeired es e child. He developed e slight drooping of the 
nesel ele on the right end en eccompenying mild nesel obstruction. 
Surgery wes done with surgeon's fee of S 1750. It wes neerly that 
much for the hospl te 1. I f he were Inc 11 ned to des1 re e colI ege 
education, would he possibly heye rether used that money to fund his 
school1ng? Would not soctety's needs be more effectively met by 
educetlng e young men, who might otherwise spend his life 
, contlnuelly dependent on welfere essistence? If he were offered the 
money, In plece of the surgery, would he teke It? Would he teke less 
money? I f so, how much less? 
SCemJrio nine: Wi thout the knowl edge of hi s prt mary cere 
physlcten e petient hed Yisited en Eer, Nose, and Throet speciettst 
who wes known to be very aggressive In the use of surgery end 
expensive energy testing. His complaint wes a mild chronic nasal 
congest Ion. Allergy test t ng and surgery wes recommended and 
accompltshed. Some time after this wes done the patient wes in his 
prtmary care physician's office and Informed him of the prior surgery. 
He commented that it did not do him any good, his nose was still 
stuffy. -But it sure cost the Insurance compeny a bundle of money .. 
He, however, wes not personally concerned about the expend1ture of 
money for en eYeluetion end surglcel procedure which did not beneftt 
him. 
The af orament toned anecdotes are Just a few of the countless 
examples which heye occurred dany tn the United States. Significant 
sums of money ere being spent tn ways thet are not cost-effective in 
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tenns of patient health and well-being. This has been allowed to 
occur because of an evolved system that has had no effective 
rlstrel nt on cost. We have had a percept ion of an unll mited mass of 
money that Is -nobody's money- and comes from nowhere. probably 
much like meny perceive the federal budget. 
Physicians eager to please patients accede to their perceived 
needs. The patient has had minimal financial restraints. Hospitals 
have been reimbursed on a cost-based and as billed basis. Insurance 
companies have not been concerned because they only need to reise 
the premiums. usually paid by the employer. The cost is tax 
deductible to the employer and not counted as income to the patients. 
Isn't this somebody's money? Doesn't somebody care about It? 
Some have felt the delivery system is at fault and so -alternate 
delivery systems,- Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's), 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO's), etc., are on the scene. As 
the new delivery systems come into action they are having the effect 
of putting the doctor and patient in an adversartal position. Those 
who market the plans seem to be saying to the patients, -you can have 
all the medical care you need (want?): In tum, they say to the 
physicians, -it is your Job to see that they don't get It.- I foresee this 
as having some serious implications. 
Many new providers have come on the scene demanding through 
the legislature their share of this ·unlimited resource· for health 
core that belongs to no one, and therefore no one acts responsibly 
toward it. At tempts are even being made in the legislature to 
mandete procedures end technologlcel equipment for Insurance 
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coveroge long before it hOI been thoroughly eyoluoted ond proven. It 
seems as though we feel that by mandating the insurance companies 
to proyide a service, we can all of a sudden create the money to pay 
for it. 
HISTORICAL BACK6ROUID OF "EDICAL COST PROIlE" 
It is surprising to many to reaUze that the practice of medicine 
in the United States has not always been a highly respected and 
financially rewarding profession. Paul Starr in his book The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine (Starr -1982) gives a very 
enlightening and scholarly account of the chlnges that have been 
witnessed In this now powerful profession. In its begimings 111 
professional transactions were strictly between the patient and the 
doctor. The physician offered a servtce, end the patient paid a fll. 
There was no significant barrier to entry into the market, either in 
terms of educational expense or by licensure. With the increase in 
scientific knowledge, society and the profession become concerned 
about the qualifications of those who practiced medicine. This 
eventually led to licensure which also gave the profession economic 
protection. 
With scientific advances in the field of medicine, it was 
recogni zed by SOCiety that medi cal core was of more cri t i cal value 
than Just caring, and the emphasis shifted from caring to curing. The 
increased cost of medical care, and the perception of its increased 
value led to concerns of how to finance it. Bismarck of Germany in 
1 e93 establtshed the first system of national sickness insurance. 
This was soon followed by other European countries and interest 
spread to America. The United States lagged behind in adopting 
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insurance, especiolly by the government. Notionol Health Insunsnce 
beceme e pollticel issue just prior to World Wer One. Its proponents 
were neyer eble to muster the pollticel support to meke it e reelity. 
PrtYate insurenee beceme the meens of proYldlng finencial protection 
in this country. Blue Cross, which eyentuelly beceme the leeding 
insurer, hed its beginning in 1929 et the Beylor Uniyersity Hospitel 
in Denes, Texes.(Rorem-1 944) OYer the veers our system of medicel 
tnsurence hIS eyolyed from hlstortcel accident and from 
tnterest-group pressure. (EnthoYen-1978e) 
The closest this netion probebly ceme to heYing e netlonal 
heelth insurance wes in the 1960s. The Democratic Perty, which hes 
elweys been the most DcttYe supporter of goyernment inYolYement in 
medicel cere, wes in power with President John F. Kennedy es 
president. His essessinetjon ceused consldereble emotionel support 
for some of his idees. With the election of lyndon B. Johnson to the 
presidency in 1964 he took edYDntege of the mood to legitimize the 
issue. In his eddress to Congress he seid, (Congresslonel Querterly 
-1965 a) 
I believe this year is the year vhen Ylth the sure IcnoYledge 
er public IUpport the cohIJress should enact e hospital insurance 
PrGIrem for tbe •. 
The administration sponsored bill, which wes also called the 
Ktng-Anderson btll, wes pessed by Congress 1n 1965. There hed been 
some proposels simnar to this introduced during the Truman 
administration, but without success. Three other meJor btlls were 
10 
also introduced as alternatives to the Medicere proposll, which wes 
another term for the Johnson edministration proposel: The Byrnes bill 
wes GOP sponsored; the Herlong-CurtiS btll, backed by the AMA Ind 
elso known es eldercere; end the Slltonstell bill. (Congresslonel 
Quarterly - 1965 b) 
The Medl cere propose 1 only Included those over ege 65. es dl dell 
the other proposals. Medicere did differ from the others In thet It 
proposed the use of the Soci el Securi ty system. The others were 111 
combinetlons of federel end stete funds, end contributions from the 
perticiplnts. This, of course, wes not e nltlonel heelth insurence but 
wes the best poUtical elternetlve, end thought by Its supporters to be 
a good start that could be extended In scope at some future date when 
the politicel climete would permit. It wes this very reeson thot the 
AMA offered such vigorous oppOSition, spending whet wes ot thet 
time e record amount of money in lobbying expense for one querter, 
$951,510. (Congresslonll Quarterly - 1965 c) This position wes in 
contrast to the posltiye position tlken earlier in 1914 by the AMA 
leeders with regerd to netionel health Insurance. (5terr-1 984 p 242) 
The resultent legislation wes Medicere. which wes linked to the 
Soclel Security System. Mediceid. I system of finenclng medicel cere 
for the poor, wes also pessed at the seme time but being considered 
In the shedow of Medicere It wes not glyen much scrutiny. 
(Wildeysky-1911) 
The pM vlte I nsurance schemes which deyeloped in the Uni ted 
Stetes h8d Y8riouS W8YS of determining provider reimbursement. but 
the method of fe8 screen, also celled usu81, custom8ry, end 
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reasonable (UCR) was mctndated by law to be used In Medicare. This 
method was first adopted on a trial basts by the Wisconsin Blue 
Shield plln in 1954 It the urging of its physician 
members.(Showstack -1919) Though not mandated by law, the 
Mediclld program in some instances, as chosen by states, also used 
the UCR method of provider ret mbursement. Showstack has se1 d th1 s 
about UCR: 
The potenttel1 nfletloDlrg impact of OCR is felt bg mlng to be ttl moat 
.rious defect. The fee-for-.rvice sptem's " .. ral leek of 
tncenttYlt to be coat effective or to mild mi. tnflation of unit pnCII, 
Is exacerbated under OCR. Because future re1mbunement levels ere 
.... on past cblroes, ~n hive a strong t ooentive to bin at a M,h 
rW. The pln,...ciln's .... 1 chlrve is incnesed bV submttting IItns 
thlt ere Id,her t .. n the curreRt ..... 1 c"rge. If tlds letton ts 
followed bV enough prwiclera1n a community, the arees's casto.,-V 
chlrae ts also reilld. 
With this method of provider reimbursement in use, the cost of 
medical care began to escalate very rapidly, as thoughtful observers 
would expect. The government emphasis in the early sixties had been 
on access to medical care, but by the end of the decade the emphasis 
was shifting to cost. on 10 July 1969 a report from HEW, known as 
the Finch-Egeberg Study, was issued and mlde the following points: 
( 1) There was 8 need for governmental and private sector act ton to 
check the rapid nse tn medical care cost. (2) The government was 
getting a poor return for its expenditures in health care. (3) The 
Medicaid program was a particular target for cost containment 
efforts. (4) The government would experiment with some local 
programs of prepaid insurance plans. (5) The government would bar 
certain providers who abused the system. (6) The practitioners were 
asked to take more responsibil i ty for cost containment. The report 
contained a statement which reflected the change in the political 
philosophy of the Nixon administration from that of the Johnson 
administration when the Medicare and Medicaid programs were 
enacted. It was a plea for action to prevent a more regulated 
governmental approach to medical care. (Congressional Quarterly 
-1969 a) 
Whit is u1tt .. lu It alia is tbe pluralistic, independent" voluRflru 
ftltun If our .. 1th can .ptem. W. vlnl .. It to pressure fir I 
.... UUdc pernlDtld daRdIllted medical can unl_ \II CIA ... 
t .. sustem wrt for Mr •• In tlda DItton. 
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Medicaid costs had a 571 Increase In three years, which was 
three times as fast as the number of Medl cald pat I ants. 
(Congressional Quarterly 1969 b) On 29 May 1969 the Senate Finance 
Commi t tee reported amendments cutting back on the Medi catd 
benefits required by the states. This was Introduced by Senator 
Clinton P. Anderson of New Mextco whose state had abruptly ended its 
Medicaid program because of Its exhausted state funds. 
(Congresst onal Qull1erly-1969c) 
Concern for cost was not limited to the Medicaid program only. 
The Senate Finance Committee on 1 July 1969 held a heering in which 
there was discussion of the Increasing cost of Medicare. Emphasis 
seemed to be on the aspects of fraud and abuse. Attention wes also 
giyen to lax governmental administration. A rather extreme example 
of a physician billing Medicare for $58,000 In house cens in one year, 
Inyolylng only 49 patients was cited. (Congressional Quarterly 1969 
b) The concern about cost, freud and abuse was an Issue that wes 
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able to enlist b1part1sGn support" and had very little problem with 
becoming a legitimate issue. 
With the cost containment issue being effectively reised" at 
leest on the leyel of the federal end stete goyernment" the next step 
wes to formulate proposals for deaJing with the problems. As with 
the approach to medicel care access" there was not a comprehenslye 
and rational analysis of the cost problem. Tentative approaches to 
the problem were expressed from many different perspectives. Dan 
Corditz in 1970 said" .he doctors created the system. They run it. 
And they are the most formidable obstacle to Its ImproYement.-
(Corditz-1970) If this statement were true" we would not expect the 
physicians to be formulating many changes to a more cost effective 
system. Such has been the case. For the most part the profession has 
been content to take positions that would tend to maintain the status 
quo. 
With the interest in medical cost containment growing" the 
proponents of natfonal health insurance revived their efforts. The 
Nattonel Committee of One Hundred for National Health Insurance" 
with Walter Reuther" President of the United Auto Workers" as the 
preSident" was organized. (National Journal -1969) Three other 
proposels were a I so presented: one by the A.M.A. " another by the 
AFL-CID" and Senator Jacob Jeylts also proposed one. During the 
Nixon campaign he had been opposed to national health insurance" but 
shortly thereafter took a less definite stand" largely as the result of 
the National Governors' Conference position in favor of national 
health insurance. This commit tee was headed by Goyernor Nelson 
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Rockefeller and thirty other republican governors. Doctor Roger 
Egeberg of the Nixon administration said that President Nixon 
expected that national health insurance would be enacted before the 
end of the decade. (National Journal -1969) There were st tIl those 
who felt that the cost problem could be solved by increasing the 
number of physi ct ans and expandi ng the hospi ta 1 f acil itt es .They 
seemed not to appreciate the manner in which the proy1ders could 
create demand wtth the cost based reimbursment schemes. 
In June of 1969 the Senate Finance Committee recommended a 5 
year extension of the Hill-Burton Act, wtth a change in the emphasis 
from rurel to urban needs. One year later Congress had to override a 
veto by President N1xon to pass a 3 year extension end provide the 
biggest amount of expendi ture si nce the Hi 11-Burton Act was passed. 
(National Journal -1970 a) This was done at the same time that 
efforts to control and coordinate hospital construction were being 
developed. These efforts ended in federally mandated health planning 
councils in each state. In February 1971 President Nixon announced a 
new national health strategy - HMO's were to receiYe the support and 
encouragement of the goyernment. President Nixon enYisi oned that 
HMO's would reyerse the incentiYes for doctors and hospitals to 
benef1t from illness ret her than health. (Starr -1984 p 396) Interest 
in national health insurance was still present when President Jimmy 
Carter was elected. He, however, saw national health insurance as a 
great ftnancial burden unless some means of cost control preceded it. 
By the end of the Certer admi n1 strat 1 on the I eg1 t 1 macy of 
government 8S a solution to the medical cost dl1emme had been lost. 
IS 
The government had embarked on Its mission Into health care with the 
goal to increase access, and thi s was accompl i shed to a great extent. 
Howeyer, because the goyernment chose to render its financial 
assistance in the cost based manner, the resultant inflation of 
medical care costs began to haye a negatiye effect on acclss. Aaron 
Wlldaysky, in his interesting manner of writing, expressed It in these 
words: (Wildaysky-1977) 
Whu should IOftrnmeM spend blllloRl for beelth care and tit bect 
DDt even token tribute? If flV8rnment is ,nng to be eccuaed of 
abusing'" poor, neglecting the middle cl_, Ind miltfng the nch; if 
1t 18 to III cendelDRld fOr Hnucnttzt AI the patient and _rei AI the 
doctor, it an _ .. 111 of that vlthDut spending trinioRl. Slander 
and cal umnies Ire lllier to beer vt.n they Ire cost free. Spendi AI 
_n for VIne treatment Is a ... a po11cU fOr oovernment alt 
YOuld be for anv of us. 
The political mood of the country continued to be more 
conS8rYat iye end In 1 980 Ronal d Reagan was elected President. There 
had been some changes in Medicare that would anow payment for 
prehospitel1zatlon diagnostic procedures. (National Journal -1970) 
President Reagan continued the trend to deemphasize care in the 
hospital setting end in September 1982 Medicere began to pey for 
hospice care. (NaUonal Journal 1982) His procompetition heelth plan 
wes introduced 1n 1982 end featured l1mited tax deductions for 
health insurance premiums, use of vouchers with which Medicere 
patients could purchase cere in prepaid health care settings, end the 
phasing out of health planning and PRO·s. President Carter had earl1er 
tried to 1 ntroduce some com pet it i ye aspects to the medi cal care 
system with a scheme from Stanford economist Alain C. Enthoyen, but 
was not successful. (Congressional Quarterly -1982) With thlt 
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netion's more conservetiye mood .. end the politicel persuesion of Mr. 
Reegen .. the competitiYe features were enected. Congressionel 
heenngs begen In Februery 1983 to promote the use of DRG·s. This 
wes e form of goyernment reguletion which would seem to be foreign 
to Mr. Reegen's philosophy .. but wes retionelized es e meens of 
Introducing competition. The idea had been used in the state of New 
Jersey on en Ill-plYOrs besis .. but wes to be used netionel1y in the 
Medicare system. It is now in force end will be greduelly phased in 
oyer e four yeer period. Feer of cost shifting to other pr1Ylte 
insurers hes prompted them to consider this form of reimbursement 
IS a meens of self protect ion. 
The present setting of medicil cere de1tyery Ind financing 18 one 
of yery significent transition. The rulings of the Federal Trade 
Commission heye set eside the time honored code omong the medical 
profession thet edyertising was unethical. There hes ensued e very 
different economic climate .. that the doctors of former yeers would 
probebly Yiew in disbelief. We speek of terms that were just a few 
years ego not found 1 n the medi ce I I j tereture. It wes not until 1979 
thet the hospitel1itereture index included the subject heeding 
-merketing of heelth serYices.- In 19B2 the heeding -economic 
competition- eppeared in the literature index. (Leyy-1985) Other new 
terms such es proYider .. consumer .. and petient encounter ere now 
heerd. These not so subtle chenges seem to hereld the new ere of 
competition which pits doctor egainst doctor .. hospitel against 
hospitel .. end medicel plan egelnst medicel plen. It seems elmost thlt 
the doctor and patient are essuming en edYerserlel role .. IS we use the 
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term patient encounter. In the midst of all this change, the public 
Image of the physician continues to decline. Sixty-two percent of the 
pubHc beUeyed that doctors were too interested In meting money In a 
1984 survey. This was en increase from 551 two years prior. In 
19B4 only 271 of those surveyed beHeYed that physicians· fees were 
reasonable, whereas In 1982 421 of the surveyed population felt that 
fees were reasonable. (AHA Newsletter 1985a) In spite of the rather 
general criticism, those included in the survey seemed to haye a more 
positive view of their personal physician. 
Perhaps not ell the blame for the infletlonary trend In medical 
costs can be blamed on the UCR method, but It would probably be a 
rare person who would argue that it was not a slgnlflcent force. 
Certainly the fee schedules and benefit schedules that haye been 
produced by third party payers have not been determined with 
consideration of the cost of production. (Showstack- 1979) This hes 
given incentive for the provfders to prescrfbe the procedures that ere 
relatively more profitable. (Reinhardt-1 975) 
The effect of this method of reimbursement on hospitals wes 
observed personally when the attempts of our community to obteln e 
hospital were frustated by the lack of funds. A proprietary hospital 
was invited to investigate the possibility of building and operating 
the hospftal. They were very wt1ling to do so but the community and 
medical staff developed some concern about how they would compete. 
They would be required to pay sales tax on ell of their supply 
purchases, property tax on the building and eqUipment, borrow money 
to bul1d the hospital, and pay a dlYidend to their stockholders. How 
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were they going to do this, when their largest competing hospital hid 
been completely built with community and church donations? They 
paid no taxes and they were nonprofit with no stockholders to pay. 
When asked how they could successfully compete they said, -We donat 
hlYe to compete. Our expenses will be hi gher and the i nsurlnce 
companies (including Medicare end Medicaid) will reimburse us more.-
It was this Interesttng revelation that facilitated the authors 
full appreciation of the very perverse Incentlyes that our method of 
financing medical care presented for all proylders. Prior to this time 
he had llyed In a world of nafvete Just wanting to be a physician and 
not be bothered or tainted by the economics of medicine. From that 
time on he made a more conscious effort to become knowledgeable of 
the intricecies of medical care financing. An Increased amount of 
t1me wes spent 1n observing the response of heelth care proylders to 
the incentives of the system. As a result of many hours of 
contemplation, a concept of financing medical care was formulated In 
his mind. This concept will be introduced and analyzed later In this 
paper. 
COST-COITAIIHEIT: HOW AID BY WHOIt? 
There can be no return to the day of unlimited, or eyen extenslYe 
resources.( King -1985) It seems quite clear that the open-ended 
third party relmbursment schemes will come to an end. It Is not a 
chotce of controls, or no controls, but in what way will costs be 
controlled end by whom?(Feln-1985) Blue Cross and Blue Shield haye 
made some rether drestlc changes In their coverege. They are setting 
up PPO'S and HMO·S, have eliminated coverage for certain cosmetic 
operetions, have replaced first dollar emergency room coverage with 
a major medical using a front-end deductible, denying payment for 
some admissions, and giving economic Incentives for early discharge 
of obstetrical patients. (Wallen-1985) Because of the Hippocratic 
oath a physician is not In a position to Umit the use of technology for 
his patient, especially when his patient Is not directly paying for It. 
This situation has lead to a cost cnsis and now the solution to access 
is the origin of our problem of cost. As a solution to this cost problem 
some SOCieties, such as Great Britain, have Umlted the amount of 
resources available to the physician. He Is then forced to select the 
most marginally beneficial uses of the available resources. 
Yarious societies have approached the control of medical costs 
In different ways, and have arrived at different amounts of 
expenditure in their control efforts. Some have poUtical goals in mind 
as they try to create a single standard of care for all people. This 
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seems to be Dn impossibility, unless the freedom of indiyiduDls to 
spend their money is unduly restricted. In England, as a result of the 
budgetary limitations of the National Health Service, the private 
sector of medical practice is growing very rapidly. This is of concern 
to the trede unions because it is a departure from their poUtical ideal 
of a single standard of health care for all people. The government, 
however, welcomes It DS a means of reducing government 
expenditures. British Health Minister Kenneth Clark said on a ylsit to 
the United StDtes; -It seems to us that spending one's own money on 
health care is not a particularly antisocial way of spending it'-<A.M.A. 
News-1984) The National Health Service of Great Britain has often 
been touted by politicians DS the solution to our country's frustations. 
This plan was developed by Albert Beyeridge with the assumption 
that there existed in a society a limited amount of morbidity and that 
it would decrease as equity of medical treatment was aYailable. 
(lllich 1976 p 221) Beyeridge had calculated that the annual cost of 
the Health Service would decrease as therapy reduced the rate of 
illness. (Office of Health Economics Prospects in Health Publication 
no.37 London 1971) Of thi s idea Dayi dOwen, Engl Dnd's Mi ni ster of 
health end social security, said, .his philosophy has proven 
hopelessly wrong; end demand far from being finite is now seen to 
approach the infinite .... All the evidence both nationally and 
internationally suggests that if need is not infinite it is certainly so 
large relatiYe to the resources that society is able to proyide now 
Dnd In the future that we cen never hope to meet it completely.-
(Owen-1976) 
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The United States hos rejected 0 government controlled system 
to limit cost. Physicians have not had the IncUnatlon or the 
Incentives to do so. Those who pay the bills - the government, 
Insurers, and the employers are trying and have made some progress 
In recent years. Some of these chenges were cited earlier. Those who 
actually benefit from a medical service, the patients, have been 
largely left out of the proposed solutions except to say that they 
should pay more out of pocket, which Is not highly popular. 
(Equitable-lgBS) Enthoven says,the benefits of Individual health 
care services are enjoyed primarily by the individual and his family, 
and he should be allowed a large measure of choice concerning It. The 
important public purposes of unlversel eccess to good-quality cere 
can be pursued most effectively in a decentral1zed private system 
guided by an appropriate structure of incentives end regulation to 
support competltlon.-(Enthoven- 1978e) How can we es a SOCiety 
discharge our social responstbllity to protect the people In their 
health, lessen the economic Impact of medical cere, and stnlallow a 
mexlmum of Individual and personal choice? 
The current political climate Is In favor of allowing end 
encouraging competition to develop. Enthoven seems to be the 
protagonist of competition and Glnzberg the antagonist. Economists 
In general probably favor reliance on market forces. 
(Rhelnhardt-19B5) Of price competition, Gjnzberg has said, ·What we 
do not need I s a radical reform centered on price rather then on 
quality. It Is not necessary, not desireble" and not even 
feeslble:(Ginzberg -19B3e) This comment Indicates the assumption 
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that there is a good correlation between cost and quality. In his years 
of medical prectice the author has not been at all convinced that 
there is a consistent relationship. There are reservations about 
introducing competition as a means of cost control in the face of the 
provider's ability to expand the demand for their services. This could 
lead to lower unit costs, but higher total cost. (Glnzberg -1982) 
Havlnghurst hes made this statement about the value of compet1tion. 
To t.. market edvocete", miAd, t.. complex trede-oftl of t.. .rt 
nqut red i I medical care callOt be add,..... YIn f II politicalsptem f I 
vlich unprovel .nefits hm high I,mboltc velue, COlbert Mdden, end 
i Rtereet troupe poall.. t.. betence of powr on .paciflc cllO'lctl. 
Imperfect _ 1t mal ItVlva be, tbl cempettt1ve market reprellnta 
potentten, It leat I sttUltiOI in vMeh the coRlumers can .. the benefits 
of economtzlng fl tangible terms Ind in tlMeh IICh economtzlng cMtce 
.netltI the IndlYidUil lIW01¥1d ret .. r t .. n llOYIrn .. nt or ... et .. r 
deep pocket. (HlVlnghurlt -1981) 
The competition that Is envisioned by Enthoven is a prtce 
competition between different types of delivery systems. (Enthoven 
- t 978a) Enthoven·s plan, In Its most slmpl1fled form, Is as follows: 
1) Congress alter the tax law so as to put a cetling on the amount of 
health insurance premium that Is tax deductible to the employer and 
the employee. 2) Employers must offer a choice of three different 
plans, each meeting minimum standards of coverage. An employee 
could pocket the difference between the most expenslve plan and the 
cheapest, if he chose the latter. 3) Rely on co-insurance or 
deductlbles to make the patient cost conscious at the point of 
servtce. 4) Special provistons to be made for health Insurance 
coverage of the low income people. 
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The writings in the literature envision competition between 
hospi ta 1 s, physt cl ans, dell very plan and insurers. The author woul d 
Introduce Mother form of competition, competition for the money 
that Is earmarked for medical care. This doesnl mean price 
competition alone, but that other uses for the money would be 
competing with a portion of that whl ch Is now being spent on 
medical care. That portion of the health care dollar to be subjected 
to competition would be that which is now being spent on more 
marg1nalltems. This form of competition could exist along with the 
other types mentioned, but could have the potential to control the 
utilization of technology, especially new and unproven methods. 
Since the resources of SOCiety are limited and medical needs 
seem I Iml t less, someone somewhere will have to choose. Having 
1 arge ly reJected the role of government to make the decl si ons, who 
will make them In our country? Perhaps the patient and his doctor 
together could make the best decisions, if glyen proper incentives. 
Is it not possible that we are oyerlooklng thepo$slbtlity of a 
significant contribution to the cost concern problem from the 
patient? (Bateman-1984) Statements such as the following are 
plentiful In the l1terature, .he alternatlYe to government regulation 
Is a voluntary cost program by physicians and hospltals.- (Dresnlck 
-1979) Does the entire burden of cost control1te with the proylders? 
I f success I s to be found in meet I ng the chall enge, I t seems to 
the author that all of those Inyolved will haye to contribute to the 
solution. It has been quite reveaUng to observe the discussions of 
medical cost containment. Most of the suggestions made by yanous 
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pertles Inyolyed someone else doing the changing. The government 
wents the proylders to chlnge their habits. The physicians want the 
patients to be less demending. Petlents think thet doctors end 
hospitals should cherge less. The hospltels, now thet DRG·s ere here, 
want the doctors to order fewer tests end keep the pet tents In for 
shorter steys. This Is a chenge from their expectetlons of physlclens 
1 n earl i er deys. 
Most plens seem to make the assumption that a patient cannot 
be en informed consumer, end therefore his Insurance company or his 
employer Is acting as his agent In negotiating for the cost of his 
medical cere. This can and has 8ccomplished some reduction in the 
prtce of medical care but even 1f the price were significantly 
reduced, this would only be a temporary solution. This would do 
nothing to get at the very core of the problem, increased utilization 
and technology. Maloney In his Presldenfs address to the American 
Surgical Association pOinted out that If we could execute a 201 
across the board reduction in the prt ce of medl ca I care, the pri ce of a 
hospital bed In 1981 would be 1945 of the 1961 cost instead of 
2121.(Ma I oney-198 1) Our current approach seems to assume that 
the same amount and type of medlcel care will be given (Thompson 
-1 983) and the only thtng to do is reduce the price per uni t. Whet 
would be helpful would be to introduce competitton for the money 
that Is ear-marked for medical care. The patient should be changed 
from a claimant (Brewster-1979) to a consumer. Patients will be 
required, In some Instances, to have less medical cere, and 10 they 
must be glyen something In return. They also need to have some 
25 
guldDnce DS to where they CDn reduce their consumption most 
judiciously. In our current insurance systems patients pay premiums, 
or they are paid for them, and the only way they cln benefit from 
them is to uttlize I medical service. Such behaYior is typified by 
scenano two in the introduction. Since it is human nature to want to 
get one's money's worth (maximize), the naturel tendency is to 
consume more clre. When clre is insured it reduces the direct cost 
to the patient and wtll thereby increase his consumption. This is 
known to the economists as morel hazard. IYan Illich made this 
comment about prepaid health care, -People forego their own liyes to 
get as much treatment IS possible.-(Illich-l 976) 
The pltient should be caused to consider cost at two points. The 
first is when he purchlses his medical insurance. The second time is 
at the pOint of service. It is the point of service choice that is most 
controversial. Cen patients melee choices Ibout their medical cere? 
The suggestion that they can and should, would haye been regarded,by 
the author, IS heresy 20 years ago. Now, however, he regerds this as 
a very Integral part of the solution to the cost cnsis. Guze has 
wntten that even though patients know much less about medicine 
than their doctor, they are entitled to particlplte in the decisions 
about their care.(Guze-19Bl) Thet pltients heve a responsibtltty and 
are capable to participate in their health care decisions is a major 
thrust of Robin's book.( Robin-1984) Freymann has included patient 
education as one of three ways of attacking the cost problem of 
medical care.(Freymann -1980) Brown has some reservations ebout 
stgnificent pltient involvement saying: 
". tRlU,. .. net riat prect.1U bece.. one doeI not vent to IJe 
confronted vltb .ICb vlnt ..... to PlI q..ttoDl tn t .. unblppg, eveld of 
111 ..... "pll buU ... ltll t .. ure ... fI rat becaUII 0 .. IIMr tliDwl vhlt 
obJecttY8 conditions 011 ..... ) au strite; -"'6 beceUll60 .. awer 
t.."lXICt1, -.v .... , feel lbout t .. ¥II ue of llter.ttve tnetments 
fer Ylrio .. objd ... COIlditio .. If YlrVlng .. ,... of IlYlritVi thtrd6 
__ ....... not feel capebl. of dletdlng Ind doll DDt wid tI .. fened 
to compute lJe..nt-cost ratios IttIching to ¥lnous treatment -til ... 
combinetto. vben en in ... ,... t ... qUllfloll. Anxtetv level, en apt 
to .. too litb .... t .. profestio.l expertiM of t.. pettent too lw .. 
permit ratio.l decision ntt ng It s~h • ti me.· (Brown 1981) 
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Brewster gives his perception of I pltlenfs need It the time he 
Is t1l. • The trouble is thlt the pltient6 when he thfnks something fs 
wrong wfth hfm6 fs not In economic min. He fs I felrful 6 ignorent6 
mlsereble6 helpless crelture. He does wlnt hellth, Ilmoet It any 
price. He is not lookfng for whit the economist cill I ·proyider. He is 
lookfng for professional Judgment .... fn short he fs lookfng for a 
trustee6 not a ·proyide"'. • (Brewster -1979) There is much In the 
literature of opinion concerning how patients will relct If posed with 
the need to be more f nvo I ved in thel r decisf ons6 but not much 
eYldence as to how they will and do relct. 
The Rand stUdy hiS shown thlt Increasing the cost sharing for 
the patient reduced the consumptfon of medfcal clre with no 
sfgnlflcant reduction In the hellth status of the people. (Brook -1983) 
(Newhouse- 1981) Usage of emergency rooms has been shown to be 
decreased by cost sharing requl rements. (O·Grady -1985) Consumers 
show a sfgnlficlnt lack of price sensltlylty In selecting I 
hosplte1.(lngulnzo-1985) It may be argued that this lack of cost 
sensltiylty Is because hospital costs have been mostly covered by 
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Insurance. People pay a. of hospital costs out of pocket but 37. of 
physicians· charges Ire met by their own paymenl.(8rown-19B1) For 
services that are ordered by the doctor, If the patient cost sharing Is 
small, the effects Ire trensltory or ylrtually n11.(Hall- 1966) In 
CaUfomla a study with welfare patients paying $1.00 for each out 
pltient physician ylslt and $0.50 for each prescription caused a 
significant Increase In the cost of In-patient care for the co-payment 
group.(Roemer-1975) From this we may learn thlt any cost sharing 
should be considered In Ught of Its Impact on delaying care that may 
Incur greater Illness and expense at a later date. 
To further study patient behaYlor with cost sharing In a 
somewhat unique setting, the Duthor proposes an experiment under 
the following conditions. At this time the author will explain the 
concept which he wl11 ca11 Choice-Card. He feels that It very much 
meets the recommendation of the Lewin study, a stUdy of the health 
care system In Utah. The study has made thl s suggest Ion: 
-... modifying tredttional health insurance so It establishes more 
appropriate Incentiyes for consumers wh11e st111 protecting them 
from the economic burdens of disease and so jt more closely 
integrates service dellyery and financing declslons.-(Lewln-1 919) 
IITRODUCI.& THE CHOICE-CARD CO.CEPT 
This approach inyolves the following features: 
1) A specified amount of money (youcher), equlyalent to the cost of 
a first dollar insurance policy, or the maximum Imount that would be 
proylded for eny other health Insurence plan is committed to 
Choice-Card enrollees. 
2) The agreement between the insurance company and the policy 
holder prov1des for periodic payment. The payments wnl constst of 
two parts. Part one would cover the premium for health insurance. 
Part two would coyer a contribution to a discretfonary fund. 
3) The lnsurence Is structured to discourege utilization of 
services that are of questionable or unproven yalue and have been 
shown in studies to provide marginal value as used in our current 
sett i ng. The disi ncent iye wi 11 be in the f onn of requi ri ng these items 
to be paid largely from the discretionary or personal funds. The 
insurance structure would also encourage those interventions which 
will be most effective and reduce future medical expense. 
4) The insurence company would issue cards as certification of 
Insurance coverage . These cards would also serve as a credit card in 
the purchase of medical services. 
5) The insurance company would honor the charged btlls and pay 
the provider in full. 
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6) The insurance cornpony would accept os a claim thot part of the 
btll that is coyered under the Insurance proyislons. 
7) That portion of I charged medical serYtce not coyered by the 
Insurance agreeement will be subtracted from the patient's 
dlscretionery fund. 
8) If expenses for medical care are Incurred that are not coyered by 
the Insurance proylsions and the discretionary fund is not sufficient 
to coyer the cost, an adYance at interest would be mlde as in a charge 
account. 
9) The sayings resulting from wise usage of medical resources and 
decrelsed uttllzltion Iccrues to the patient In the discretionary fund 
accumulating oyer a lifetime. 
10) The discretionary fund is invested by the insurance company 
and the Interest Iccrues to the patient. 
11) The discretionary fund is portlble Ind goes with the employee 
If he chlnges employment. 
12) A portion of this dlscretionlry fund Iboye a certain reserYe 
leye) would be ayal 1 ab 1 e to the pat lent for other consumer items. 
CO""EITS 01 THE BASIC COICEPTS OF CHOICE-CARD 
At the Inception of this experiment there would be a 
commitment to allow for this medical insurence plen the sime 
Dmount that would be allowed by the employer to finance a regullr 
pol1cy that was being madelYIUeble to other employees. The money 
paid to the Insunsnce company by the employer In the patient's behalf 
would be dlYided Into two different funds: the insunnce trust portion 
end the patient discretionary fund. This discretionary fund would be 
considered the patient's money and would be drawing Interest to his 
Iccount If unused. This discretionary fund would be ayatlable from 
which the patient could pay his required portion of incurred medical 
expenses. It would also form a pool from which all participants 
could borrow, if needed, for their medical expenses. In early 1985 
there was a company In Indi ana by the name of Medical Bankcard 
Corporetion of Indianapolis that marketed a medical credit card.(AI1A 
News-1985c) If this is successful It may be possible that they would 
offer to be the financing organization for credit beyond which the 
dtscretionlry fund would provide. A recent newsplper report 
Indicates that another company, Benensl Electric Credit Corporetlon, 
hiS also entered into the proYislon of credl t for medi ca I care. 
(Deseret News-1986) This discretionary fund would belong to the 
pettent. It could be regarded 8S a Medical IRA, (Rogers-198S) 
(Goodman-1984) and could be transferred with him In the event of a 
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Job tnmsfer# or would be a cushion in the eyent of unemployment. 
Perneps he could use it to pay his shere of MeIth cere premiums. 
(Brewester-1979) In order to help the patients reaUze that this 
money in the discretionary fund is indeed potential1y theirs for other 
purposes# it could be mede ayanable for purchese of other nonmedical 
items when the reserve accrued aboYle certein minlmelleye1. It 
would be considered e prudent move to require e higher leyel of 
reserve in the discretionery fund as e person gets older. If there was 
a significent amount of seYings in the discretionery fund it could 
provide e sizeble resource eyaileble when they reeched "edicere age. 
If a petient or his family wanted to have services thet were poorly 
covered by the insurance portion they could borrow when the 
discretionery fund was depleted# and in the event of the petient's 
death it could be repaid from 11fe insurance benefits. A possible 
yenetion and broadening of the scope of this concept would be to 
meke 11fe# disabillty# end possibly long tenn care insurence eyeileble# 
as funds eccumulete in the discretionery fund from conservetiye use 
of medi ca I resources. 
This discretionary fund would be the patienfs money to be 
used at his discretion for medical cere end it is hoped would 
introduce an element of responsibl1ity on his pert as to how heelth 
cere resources ere expended. A Study by Golfarb in which he anelyzed 
length of stay and usage of anct11ary services# concluded that ebntty 
to pay did not influence usage of services. (Goldferb-1983) This 
study could be used to ergue that petients win not be cost conscious. 
The conditions and incentiYes operating in that study would be 
significantly different than those operating In the Choice-Card 
concept, and such a conclusion would not be Justified. 
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An services for which on Insurance company would assist would 
be paid on a defined benefit basis (fee schedule) end not on the 
cost-based and as bUled basiS. Health Care Financing Administration 
has accepted a Joint proposal by Harvard end AHA to do a stUdy on a 
revised relative value system. They want to consider the viability of 
a fee schedule to replace the current Medicare system of reimbursing 
physicians.(AMA News-1985e) This endeavor Is an acknowledgement 
that the open-ended systems of the past are coming to an end. The 
defined benefit of ChOice-Card insurance may differ significantly 
from the current rete in many Instances. The consumer would be 
aware thet for essentially every purchase he made, there may be 
some contribution required of him. This would be for 8ach service ond 
at all levels of care. This would eliminate the lack of cost effective 
behavior on the part of the patient after an annual deductible or 
co-payment is met. The following factors would be considered In 
determining the fee: 
a) Is the condition for treatment potentially life threatening? 
b) Does It threaten future function? If so, what function and how 
Yltalis that function from society·s point of Ylew? 
c) Will delay of diagnosis or treatment likely incur greater expense 
or Impairment in the future? 
d) Is the procedure thoroughly developed and by scientific study 
shown to be effecttve? Is the proper use and the clinical setting well 
defined? 
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e) How wen can the diagnosis and" therefore" the need for the 
procedure be confirmed by others" as a means of monitoring? As an 
example -appendectomy" as compared to Insertion of Yentllatlon 
tubes I nears. 
f) Is the procedure totally or in part cosmetic? 
g) Whit is the cost-effectiYeness ratio? Some have suggested 
third party insurers pay only for those procedures with a ratio aboye 
a certain specified leye1.(Thompson-1983) 
h) What Is the consensus among the medical profession regarding 
the need for the procedure or the need for hospitalization? Eighty to 
ninety percent of all hospital admissions are for procedures and 
diagnoses that occur at a highly yarlable rate from one hospital area 
to another. (Wennberg-19B4D) This Yariatlon is not confined to the 
United States or to one type of deltyery system.(Wennberg-19B4b) 
Others have been able to yalidate the same concluslon.(Bames-19B5) 
Wi th the help of thl s research those surgical procedures and those 
medjcaladmissions with wide Yariations of frequency cen be 
identified. When the frequency is so yarled the question may be asked 
as to what rete Is correct?(Wennberg-1986c) There Is not good 
eYidence for a conclusion" but there Is no evidence that there is any 
difference in the health of those people in areas of low rates. 
For those identified circumstances of sjgnjficant Yariation" the 
payment from the insurance fund would be set at a lower amount. 
This would leaye the patients with a greater amount to pay from their 
discretionary or personal funds. The incenttve for the pattent would 
then be to stay out of the hospital or to ayoid surgery" and he would 
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exert some pressure on his phystclan to use alternatives. The fact 
that a fee Is set for a procedure does not obligate the provider to 
accept that fee. He only needs to conYlnce the patient to pay more 
then the insurance fee. Yanous types of procedures would be paid as 
follows: 
Laboratory ODd X-naY diagnostic studtes: These would be paid entlnly 
from the patient discretionary fund. This would Include all diagnostic 
procedures, Including endoscopy. 
Hospital charges: Paid on a Diagnostic Related Grouping (DRG) basis 
with modification according to the epidemiological eYldence of the 
variabnlty In Incidence of admission In various 10caUties for that 
diagnosis. After a period of time, In the hospital equivalent to the 
ayerage for that diagnoSiS, further payment would be based on e 
probebnity of benefit from continued hospltellzetlon. The suggestion 
that we make end implement medicel deci slons on the besl s of 
probebility hes been suggested by Leaf. (Leaf-1984) 
SUrgical fees: Meny fectors would be used to compute these, such as 
length of trllln1ng, time required, sknl, risk, time involved 1n the 
procedure, end prectlce expense which would include melprectlce 
Insurence. Also Included In the fectors could be e reesoneble Income 
besed on en eyerege cese load.(Roe-1985) The aSSignment of a 
surglcel fee would also teke Into conslderetion the epldeml010glcel 
eyldence of significant Yanatlon In tncldence of the procedure. 
Remuneretlon based on complexity should be abandoned. What mey be 
considered difficult to one may not be to enother, and this may In 
reality tend to enow those who mey be less skilled to charge more. 
• 
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Thts parttculor method hosled to flognnt abuse of the intended 
purpose as most doing cl ai ms review can attest. Agai n It is 
emphasized, the fact that a fee may be set by the insurance does not 
obltgate the surgeon to the fee, but he must negotiete the difference 
with the patient. This particular approach to the remuneration of 
procedural skills, as compared to cognitive sktlls, could do much to 
correct a very sertous problem for the medical profession - to reduce 
the disparity in physician income according to specialty. When Paul 
Beeson, M.D., addressed the Utah state Medical Association Convention 
in October, 1984, he was asked what he felt was the most significant 
problem facing organized medicine. His answer was, the lorge 
discrepancy in payments for cognitive services, as compared to the 
procedurally oriented surgical services. If Dr. Beeson is correct, and 
there are many who agree with him, any change in our system of 
medical care financing should address this problem. Past AMA 
President Joseph F. Boyle has said that the ANA needs to direct its 
attention to physician Income and fees. He notes that some 
pediatrtcians are earning Just 11/2 times the income of garbage 
collectors Gnd some family physicians will earn only slightly more 
than a deck hand on an oil tanker. He expressed concern oyer the 
outrageous charges and incomes of some physicians. (Boyle-l98S) 
The emphasl sand efforts of the government to encourage 
generalization of medical practice are largely negated by the 
Incentiyes of the procedurally ortented reimbursement 
schemes.(Showstock-1918) 
The circumstances under which the surgery is done will also be 
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consl dered I n set t I ng the surgl calfee. Meny times surgl cal at tempts 
are made when there I s no reasonable hope of the pat lent survlvl ng or 
being benefited by the procedure. Under such circumstances the 
insurance trust would not pay for the surgery. The author would 
propose that In these Instances computer assistance be employed to 
gl ve probabl II ties based on the past experience of pri or pat I ents wi th 
slmnar clinical findings and conditions. (deDombel-1986) 
Payment for Medlcotion: Medications that are primarily symptomatic 
would not be reimbursed from the insurance but required to be paid by 
the discretionary fund. Long term therapeutic medication would be 
paid for from Insurance. Conditions, such as hypertension where we 
have reasonably good eYldence of the abl 1 Ity to prevent onset of 
problems that will lead to greater dlsabllty, morbidity and Increased 
medical expense, If not adequately cored for, would be fully funded 
from the insurance portion. Diabetes Menltus Is also such a 
condition" though the eYldence that treatment avoids later medical 
complications is debated. It seems quite clear that by careful 
management, episodes of diabetic acidOSis and hypoglycemia can be 
diminished, and thereby decrease the related medical costs. 
Immunizations would be Included as an Insurance benefit. 
In making a medical purchase, the patient would use a credit card 
and when he agrees to a serYl ce and the pri ce for that service, hi s 
Signature on the transaction record obligates the insurance company 
to pay the proylder. The Insurance compeny would pay their obligated 
portion and from the patient dlscretionery fund would obtain the 
remainder. In the event that the patient dlscretlonery fund was 
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depleted# the potient would be odvonced the resources much os in 0 
credit card charge transact 10n. 
This feature of placing the pattent in debt to the insurance 
company and not to the provider is justified by the fact that payment 
of a physicfan's fee is related more to the patienfs inclination to pay 
than their abllity to pay# as any practitioner cen attest. EYen popular 
magazines in giving financial management advice recommend paying 
the doctor last because the patients haye nothing that the physician 
can repossess. Thls attitude among patients has led to a more 
aggressi ye posture on bi 11 collecting by physicians # whi ch has not 
been in their best publfc interest. In the Choice-Card system# if a 
patient was incUned to default on their loans this could put their 
insurance coverage in jeopardy. Lest this approach be thought to be 
harsh you may be reminded that the insurance coyerage will be 
structured in such a way as to coyer quite well those essential and 
clearly beneficial services. 
This plan would# in effect, take some of the money now going to 
health insurance premiums and make it the patient's money# or 
potentially theirs. The cost of insurance premiums would be less 
because of the selectt ve coverage in contrast to the open-ended 
policies of the past. It would requlre payment of personal or 
discretionary funds for those conditions and procedures not 
demonstrated to be effectiye# and if foregone would not be likely to 
have an adverse effect on the patienfs health. In those conditions, 
where a clear cut benefit is demonstrated# that care would be paid 
with none or minimal personal or discretionary funds. This avoidance 
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of en across the boord cost sharing of al1 medical costs could do much 
to obYlate the concerns of decreased access to those of lower income. 
The inherent structure of the insurance payments would encourage the 
proven interventions. by requiring less cost-sharing. end discourage 
the use of unproyen pnctices. or those of marginal benefit by 
requiring larger cost-sharlng.(Wennberg -1984d) This design of 
insurance coyerage would haye a built In educational feature for 
patients. 
If It wes suggested by a surgeon thet a cerotld endarterectomy 
be done in an asymptomatic patient with a bruit. and the surgeon 
charge was $1800 with a hospital charge of $4500. the finding of a 
patient thet the Insurance paid $200 for the surgeon end a $500 DRG 
for hospital would serve as a red fleg to the patient that further 
investigation and a second opinion might be obtained. 
There has been a 4671 increase in the incidence of carotid 
endarterectomies of the head and neck from 1971 to 1982. The 
evidence of the effectiveness of this approach. as compared to 
medical therepy. has not been clearly demonstrated. (Dyken-1984) In 
a review of 431 endarterectomy procedures done in 16 different 
hospitals there WIS a demonstrated mortality rate of 2.0. and an 
Intreoperative stroke rate of 8.61. There was a combined morbidity 
and mortlltty rate of 9.61. Fifty percent of the patients in the study 
were asymptomatic prior to surgery.(Brott-1984) This means that If 
one had 100 patients with asymptomatic bruit and operated on them. 
within one week's time ten of them would be either dead or with a 
stroke. This eyldence suggests very strongly that In an attempt to 
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prevent 8trok.8~ the therepy mDy~ in reality, be causing more harm 
than the natural course of the disease. 
Untt) it is demonstrated that a therapy is clearly beneficial, 
should insurence be paying for It? There is accumulating thought that 
attempts to contain medical cOlts should be directed at those 
marginal~ unnecessary~ and unproven ventures.(Angell-l9B5) We 
should make efforts to provide coyerege for thole clearly effective 
modaHtjes. The fact that the United States is spending nearly four 
times the per capita amount on health care as England and 
one-and-a-half times as much as Sweden,(Angel1-19B5) without any 
demonstrable difference in our health as a natton~ may be additional 
evidence that we can reduce our expendj tures without Impairing 
health. 
Diagrams showing a comparison of Choice-Card~ (Figure 1) 
traditional insurance~ (Figure 2) and a health maintenance 
organization (Figure 3) are shown. In these examples it is assumed 
that the employee is contributing to his health insurance~ though this 
is not always required. Some sample trensacttons are also shown 
(Figure 4). 
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Patient needs appendectomy: Surgeon charges .......... S6S0.00 
Insurance trust pays ... S62S.00 Patient obligation ......... S2S.00 
Hospital charges ......... $1500.00 
Insurrance pays .... $1450.00 Patient obligation .......... S50.00 
Status of patients discretionary fund ....................................... S500.00 
Total of patient obligation for surgeon and hospital S 75.00 
Amount remaining in patient discretionary fund .................. $425.00 
Patient- 'Wen corrected hearing by hearing aid desires tympanoplasty: 
Surgeon charges .... $1200.00 
Insurance pays ...... $200.00 Patient obllgation ... $1000.00 
Hospi tal charges .... $1250.00 
Insurance pays ....... $210.00 Patient obligation .... .s.l040.00 
Status of patients discretionary fund ................................................ S 1600.00 
Total patient obligation for surgeon and hospita1. ............. $2010.00 
Amount of advance credit to patient ......................................... $ 410.00 
In this trflnsflction the discretionary fund is depleted. The amount 
advanced 'Would be repaid at interest over a twelve month period. 
FilJllrll4.. 5I11II/I11111' 5II1II6 Plliilllli ellTll TrllllSllctitlllS 
WOULD THE PUBLIC ACCEPT SUCH A RADICAL CHAI6E? 
The Choice-Card concept would require a significant change In 
the role of patients as consumers of health CDrI. How willing wt11 
they be to accept changes? The Equitable Health Core Survey of 1985 
gives some interesting inSights: (Equitoble-1985) 
- In excess of 701 of employers report changes in their health 
plans In the post 3 years. 
- 50 1 of these pI an changes i nyolyed increased deductlb les for 
patients. 
- 531 of employees whose cost shoring hod increosed in the post 
3 yeors regerded thet increase as acceptable. 
- People eemlng less than $15,OOO/yeor are much more 
adversely effected by increesed cost shering. 
- Changes mode so for appear to not hoye shifted costs from 
employer to employee, but hoye altered their behoYior to reduce oyer 
all health core expenditures. 
- Reduced access to health core by Increasing cost shoring has 
not been shown to be significant. The effects and potential effects 
ere more dramatic on low income employees. 
- Host employees are affected by cost shoring. However 301 do 
not pay deductibles, 261 do not pay co-payments~ 401 do not 
contribute to their insurance premIum. 
- It is more acceptable to employees to contribute to their 
premium than to heye deductlb 1 es or co-peyment. 
A pnor, 1983, Equlteble survey reyeeled thet the public wes 
remerkebly ewere end concerned ebout the problems releted to heelth 
care financing end heelth cere services. This survey also suggested 
thet, contrery to populer thought, the Amencen public wes willing to 
eccept e broed renge of propose 1 s end Ideas on medlcel cost 
contelnment. (Equlteble-1983) 
The follow up study In 1985 confirmed thet as the chenges did 
occur there wes es1gnlflcent proportion of the public that was 
willing to accept them. This eyldence thet there Is not a significant 
public opposition to more finenciel involyement In their medlcel cere 
would seem encouraging thet they mey be accepting of the 
Choice-Cerd concept. 
POSSIBLE I"PACT OF CHOICE-CARD ON OTHER SYSTE"S 
Not all patients would be willing to participate ln Cholce-Card, 
but it would appear from public surveys that many would. If a portion 
of the population were to engage in financtng of medical care this 
way, much information of yalue to government, society, and insurers 
could potentially be gained. 
In the current setting, HMO's and alternatiYe delfYery systems 
are expected to provide an answer. The term alternate delivery 
system is used to describe what should be used to achieve 
cost-containment. In the author's opinion there is nothing wrong with 
the delivery system. It is an alternate financing system that is 
needed. HMO's generally proylde similar servlces as people obtain in a 
traditional setting at a reduced unit cost; they tend to match the 
benefits of insurance companies. With the exception of tonsl1lectomy 
and adenoldectomy., the amount of discretionary surgery done by 
HMO's does not seem to be significantly less and it does not appear 
that they obtain much of thei r sayi ngs by a decreased I ength of stay. 
(Luft-197Bc) It also appears that care of rheumatoid arthritis in the 
HMO setting does not lead to decreased usage of expenstye Inpatient 
and outpatient procedures.(Yel1n-19BS) It is quite likely that there 
wtn always be insurers that provide generous benefits, largely first 
dollar coverage, and that there will always be some citizens or 
corporations who can, and will, afford this coverage. Assume, also, 
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that one or some of these insurence companies provided artificial 
hearts as a benefit. The HMO's would be under considereble marteet 
pressure to match this benefit. If they did so, they may provide them 
at a decreased unit cost, but they would be providing a new 
technology that would significantly increase the capitation cost. 
This would have happened without any direct expression from the 
individual cittzens as to how wt1Ung they were to finance such 
techno logy_ 
The Choice-Card concept would provide a very generous amount 
of money by the standards of other nations for an indiyidual's health 
cere. The patients would then exercise their individual choices as to 
how they used their discretionary fund and their credit. If they chose 
to spend considerably more than the capped amount and forego other 
items, such as homes, automobiles and entertainment, to purchase 
artificial hearts and other expensive health care technology, SOCiety 
will have gained significant information about how the citizens yalue 
health and health care. The converse would also be true. If the 
patients showed a clear preference for other items by using their 
excess discretionary funds, and were not willing to incur debt for 
medical care beyond that provided by the insurance; it could then be 
said that perhaps there has been excess spending for medical care. 
What better way to determine an appropriate amount to allocate on 
health care? 
This type of a system would give incentive to offer care at 
lower cost and to approach problems in the most cost effective 
manner. With the past open-ended system of financing medical care a 
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new technology or treotment wos not required to be delivered In 0 
cost effectlYe woy. It wos more of 0 politicol bottle to Influence the 
Insurers to PlY for It. Once thot decision hod been reoched the 
Incentiyes for reducing the cost or for cost-effectlYe utUizotion 
were minimized. If 0 new technology needed to meet the test of 
cleorly demonstrated effectlYeness, cleorly determined 
clrcumstonces for Its use, ond potlent willingness to poy for It, It is 
quite like1y thot much more refinement would be witnessed before 
wide acceptlnce wos realized. 
Those who would be utilizing the new technologies would be 
those most offluent ond who could offord them. Undoubtedly this 
would meet with some public cnticism thet the effluent cou1d obtoln 
core not OYlnoble to others becouse of economic borriers. This would 
be e reyersol of the roles of mony yeers ego when the outhor wos in 
training. Then the Indigent potients were the ones who had new 
techniques tried on them ond the publ ic then complolned thot the poor 
were being used for experimentotion. This would be yery likely to 
reduce the speed with which new technology would be introduced, and 
undoubtedly there would be some lIYes lost by thot delay. This, 
howeyer, would be counterbalonced by the Increased sofety and 
understanding of compUcatlons of these InnoYations before being so 
widely introduced. Also, it would preyent the mlsallocotlon of scorce 
resources in I neff ect lYe yentures as has been seen in the past. The 
misallocotion of scorce resources con also cost liYes. 
This is 0 painful thought that there moy be the loss of some )fyes 
that could hoye been soyed by the more rapid introduction of new 
methods. There# however# would be a reduction In mortality from the 
too rapid introduction of new techniques. The mortality Is always 
highest at the time of a new technology Introductlon# before 
complications are fully appreciated and before the subset of patients 
most benefited Is determined. With money for new surgical 
techniques less available there would be less Incentiye to expand the 
techniques to a larger number of Insti tut ions. Whenever a new 
cardiac surgery team Is deyeloped, the early mortality and morbidity 
retes do not match those of the established units. If there is concern 
for the possibility of some unnecessary deaths occurring, let us not 
forget that our society is wining and# In fact# subsidizes the 
production of 0 product (tobocco) thot leads to the premature death of 
1000 people each dey. A slowing in the introduction of innovative 
treetments could never approach thet megnt tude of humen loss. Our 
society is quite eccepting of someone for economic reasons, putting 
themselves, or someone of their own famtly at risk for reasons not 
related to medicol care. They may bal ance the cost of some new 
tires now versus driving on the bold t ires for a few more months. 
They may defer the relining of their brakes because of economiC 
reasons, and thereby increase their safety hazard. They may elect for 
economic reasons to purchase a small automobile with a smaller 
purchese price and less operating expense, when the automobile 
safety studies quite clearly indicate that they would be much safer in 
a larger, more expenslye automobile.( Brown-t965) They may not 
Invest In a smoke alarm system at home, ond we accept these 
decisions made with economics in mind and which put people's Uves 
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and well-being at stake. If people were required to make choices 
between helith cere end money for other uses, there is concern thet 
they might neglect heelth. Brewster seys he hes sufficient 
confidence in the hypochondrie of men thet this wt11 not be e serious 
problem.(Brewster-1979) 
It is the euthors opinion thet some of these preceding exemples 
heye e much greeter probebtlity of ceuslng humen herm, suffering, end 
unnecessery deeth then the omission of e CAT scen in eye 1 uet ing 
chronic heedeche,or the omission of en endoscopic exem in the 
eYeluetion of e petlent with upper gestrolntestlnel bleeding. In fect, 
the evidence indicetes thet the routine use of upper gestrointestinel 
endoscopy In ecute bleeding mey ceuse en increese in compllcetions 
end not proylde eny direct benefit to petient cere.(Eestwood-1981) 
No public outcry should be Justified If thet omission is elected by the 
petient with the edYice end input of e physicien who recognizes the 
unique espects of thet indlYlduel petient's cese. One who hes weighed 
with proper incentive the probebtlity of obtelning cl1nicelly helpful 
informetlon in the cere of the petlent versus the expenditure of funds 
thet come, not from the endless monetery suppl ies of the insurance 
compeny or the government, but from the resources thet belong to the 
petlent. 
Howeyer, if e physicien is unileterally involved in meking direct 
decl slons thet put others et some i ncreesed ri sk, how eyer smell, thet 
Is e very different metter. This seems to be derived from e societel 
expectetion of physiclens, end elso from en indiytduel's eversion to 
bel ng responsi b I e for inJury or ml sf ortune to others. Thi s feel t ng of 
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greater responsibility for others than for oneself is particularly 
strong among physicians. It seems to the author that as long as the 
patient Is Insulated from some choice in containing medical cost, and 
the entire burden Is placed on the physicians, success will not be 
forthcoming. If, pemaps, the cost were reduced without patient 
Input, the decisions made along the way may not reflect or conform to 
the yalues of the indlyldual citizens. Personal preferences (Implicit 
Judgments) are to be favored oyer expl1cit Judgments In medical care. 
(Schwartz-1973) As an example, Schwartz notes that in choosing air 
trayel versus train trayel one weighs cost, convenience and increased 
speed, against the slightly increased nsk of death by accident. 
Choice-Card could also giye opportunity to observe for evidence of 
decreased health and well being of those who consumed less medical 
care. These cittzens would have made a chOice, and society should not 
feel morally responsible if there was demonstrable ill effects. We 
tolerate self-destructive behavior in many other ways: tobacco, 
alcohol and accidents in dangerous sporting actlYitles. 
As the wri t i ng of thi s paper was in process, the tragi c acct dent 
of the spaceship Challenger occurred. Some of the expressions about 
that event indicated the heroic nature of these people who were 
willing to risk their ltYes In the search for new Information that may 
be of potential value to mankind. The author Indeed feels that they 
were heroes Involyed In a dramatic way. Should we not also think of 
IndlYiduals who would be wt1l1ng to forgo the application of new 
unproven, but potentially beneficial, technologies in their behalf as 
heroes? They would be helping us to le8m information that could 
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benefit us os 0 notion. There is much evidence to suggest thot in spite 
of our significontly greoter expenditure on heolth care we as a 
society are not particularly any healthier. How much should we 
spend, and how are we going to determine this? Choice-Card may be 
one way to learn. 
This concept will put a patient in a different role, and many 
would not want to be as involved in medical decision making. They 
may prefer to let the doctor make all the decisions. It has been 
pOinted out that when a person is ill, or afraid that they might be 111, 
that they are not inclined to be considering price, or to be involved in 
making decisions about their health care. (Relman-1980) Glnzberg 
has said that he does not feel that patients can be persuaded from 
purchasing the services that a physician has advised. (Ginzberg-1980) 
There are, however, many people who are not content to leave It all to 
the physician. It may be more cost effective to alter by education the 
attitude end expectaUons of the recipients of medical care, then to 
satisfy those wants by menipulating the health care system. 
(Maloney-l 981) Whet a phystcien recommends is frequently not based 
on sound medicallogic, but in response to the economic incentives 
presented him and his perception of what the patient expects. If, as 
Ginsberg states, the patient will follow a physician's advice, a 
system is needed that win give the physician incentive to give good 
advice medically, as well as economically. Also needed is a system 
to evolve a more i nf ormed pati ent. 
An active, increased interest in patient information is mantfest 
by a patient information center in New York City that Is thriytng and 
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growing. After the Inlt101 center In New York, there ore now potlent 
Informotion centers In four other mojor centers. (ConcI10-1964) 
Fifty-six percent of the Amencon public feels 0 need for more 
tnformotlon obout medlcol core, ond 60S of them wonted 0 system in 
which heolth Informotlon wos oyolloble through doctors ond hospitols 
on 0 regulor bOSIS. (Sommers-1976) 
Mo loney soys thot when the public becomes owore of the 
difficulty thot we ore hoving in demonstroting 0 relotlonship of 
heolth core delivery ond heolth, they may elect other nonmedicol 
Items, such os home ownership recreotion or children's educotion. 
(Moloney-1gBl) Choice-Cord could Introduce 0 method for moklng 
thot election. 
PATIENT EDUCATION: HOW AND BY WHO"' 
For a patient to have his medical care financed with the 
Choice-Canl concept would require much more patient education than 
is currently available. How will this be done and by whom? There are 
several possibll1tles, none of which are exclusive of the others. 
Employer: If the program were offered by a self-insured 
corporation, the task of patient education and information could be 
done by the corporation. Inasmuch as the corporation Is self-insured, 
It Is possible that a role by them in patient education, which would 
stress reduced utl1izatlon, could be perceived by the patient and 
pubHc as a confHct of Interest. This could be minimized by the 
corporation being willing to commit to a specific amount of money to 
the medical core for each employee. If, by careful utl1lzatlon by the 
patients, the cost of insurance premiums should go down, the amount 
of money saved would not accrue to the company, but would be shifted 
to the patient's discretionary fund. 
Another possible problem with the corporation assuming this 
role is that this may appear to put the corporation in the role of 
practicing medicine. This concern was expressed to the author in a 
personal conversation with a corporate executive. Corporations must 
be sensitive to actions which would appear to put them in a 
competitive role with private practicing physicians. 
Physician Edycator: It Is also possible that the role of patient 
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educator and information source could be a legitimate bustness 
endeayor by physicians who do not engage directly in patient care. 
They might serYe as a source of objectiye medical information to the 
patient. They could employ yanous other health care personnel, such 
as dieticians, nutritionists, home health care specialists, etc. Their 
role would be to proyide information about yanous medical options 
wtth information about how well end cntically eyaluated these 
opttons haye been studied. Haying as their objectiye the proyisions of 
information and the answering of specific questions by patients, and 
not the proyision of that serYice, perhaps a more unbiased 
presentation may be obtained, than from a physician who stands to 
profit from the performance of a test or procedure. 
There would be a cost for this information in time and money. 
Those who would elect to join the Choice-Card plan in the first place 
would most likely be willing to commit the time. The financial costs 
could be met in seyeral possible ways: (1) a giyen amount of money 
could be proyided each year as an insurance benefit to be used in 
pattent education; (2) they could use funds from their discretionary 
fund; (3) personal funds could be expended. As noted earlier, such 
information centers are in existence and people are wt1Ung to pay for 
thl s serYi ceo 
Insurance Company: The insurence company could play this role 
of education source, but there could also be a potenttal confHct of 
interest percejyed. One adYantage of the insurance company acting In 
this role would be the single source of Information for insurance 
coyerage details and medical information. From personal 
ss 
conversations with insurance executives the impression is obtained 
that they would not be particularly interested In this role. 
Goyernment Agency: Another posst bl e source for the medical 
infonnatlon would be a government agency. There has been a 
precedent set In the role of government as a source of Information by 
the extension service of the United States Department of Agriculture. 
This approach, however, could and most likely would be, Interpreted 
by the medical profession as entering Into their turf. This would also 
be true for the I nsurance company tnvolvement. 
Primary Core Physician: Another method of provl ding pat lent 
education would be from the patient's primary care physician. In the 
author-s opinion this would be the ideal way. The term doctor has its 
root in the latin word -docere- which means teach. Most people think 
of a doctor as one who Is trai ned to dl agnose and treat dl sease, and 
his role as a teacher is largely neglected. There Is certainly very 
1 itt 1 e taught to physi ci ans In trat ni ng about thei r role as a teacher. 
Our current system of physician reimbursement does not give 
economic Incentive to educate patients, and os 0 result there Is not 
much effective patient education being done. 
In spite of this foct, some physicians regord patient educotlon 
as on Invasion of their profession. (Del Gludice-lg8S) As the author 
began the practice of pri vate medi ci ne an older physt ct on gave hi m 
some advtce that was wen intended to help him ·succeed· as a 
physician. This advice, however, was somewhat disturbing to him. 
The older physician'S recommendations seemed all calculated to 
create a dependency in patients by requiring frequent unnecessary 
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return visits. His advice was to encourege patients to feel thet their 
problems were of greater magnitude than actuality .. and to encourage 
the belief that only he (the physician) could handle their problems. If 
a proper role of a physician is to educate .. and one of the goals of 
education is to develop independence in his patients .. that advice 
seems inappropriate to a physician. It .. howeyer .. was very sound 
economic advice .. as he could evidence. 
Newton states that it Is the first task of a physician to teach his 
patients the following (this certainly suggests creating an 
independent patient): 
To understand hellth is to nelia tblt it is not identical vlth If.ling 
.'; thlt it 1s unreelistlc to expect tD feel ... aU of the tt me; tblt 
depending on individual circumstances VI au hive 10 expect quite. 
bit of feeling bed .. even outri9ht pain _ • Plrt of the ... n 
cendlt1on; tI'M the h1storu of t.. halMn race suggests thlt our 
tlpecitu for copt", wit. pain il a lot larger thin VI tend to .. ume; 
and thlt a penonall U dPNeloped abtlity 10 10 cope developed by 
pracHce .. is a substantial part of nil health. To value health is to 
decide upon a stule and pattern of 11fe that Yin maximize tbe abtlity 
to cepe la,...l U by mi n1 mizi AI the bodU's need for oubi. 
help.(NNton-1979) 
To accompllsh effective patient education by the primary cere 
physician 1t would be desirable to alter the form of primary care 
physi ci en rei mbursement to a capt tat i on type. Gabel has noted that in 
his opinion capitation is a method of payment suitable for primary 
care physicians only. (Gabel-1919) Moloney has mentioned the great 
potential of a generalist to reduce the demand for high cost 
technology .. but cautions that a too shallowly trained one could 
actual1y increase the use of technology through specialty 
consultations.(Moloney-1919) 
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When the physician tends to profit from services provided, he 
may lose his obJectlYity in proYidlng patient information and advice. 
He also Is not In any way rewarded for expending the time to educate. 
Why should he teach a young mother about the nature of virus 
Illnesses and the Ineffectlyeness of penicillin therapy? It will only 
educate 30 office ylslts out of his practice for that one family each 
year. Perhaps if the primary care physician could be regarded as a 
financial manager of health care resources, and not a proYlder of care 
only, then his role and system of reimbursement could be seen in a 
different perspective. This would also reduce the Incentlye for 
primary care doctors to hoye extensive laboratory and x-ray, from 
which they are tempted to profit. It is of interest that It has been 
regarded as generall y unethical for a physl clan to have a pharmacy 
and profit from the prescriptions that he writes, but not considered 
so to have technology from which he profits. The physician generally 
holds the patient much more captlye with regard to technology then 
he would with regard to prescriptions. 
This idea of regarding the primery physician as a manager of 
medical resources was first Introduced to the author in a 
conYers8tlon with a management consultant who was employed by a 
large national accounting firm. Initially there was discussion of 
physicians' Income versus accountants'. The author hod learned thot 
some of the partners In the large accounting firms had incomes in the 
$150,000-$200,000 range annuolly. The mon8gement consultant 
expressed that if his physician was paid $150,000-$200,000 per year 
he would regard that as excessive. It was described how his company 
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could objectively arrive at a fee for their accountants' services. If 
they studied the operation of a corporation, and suggested some 
courses of action that would save the company $1,000,000 in taxes, 
the company would be happy to pay 101 of the savings to his finn. The 
fact that a physician may have saved ten lives a year was mentioned, 
and the question posed as to how much that was worth? The given 
answer was that you can't put a value on human Ufe. Indeed putting a 
velue on human Ufe is difficult, and attempts to do so by various 
methods have resulted in very different answers. (Hapgood-1980 ) 
(Blomquist 1981) We also need to consider the quality of ltfe and 
how much that is worth. Physicians are much more frequently 
improving the quaUty of Ufe than saving it. Answers to this question 
are not any more easy than to the value of Ufe. (Avom-19B4) 
Perhaps if the primary care physician was regarded, not IS I 
saver of humin lives or In improver of life qUllity only, but elso as a 
manager of finlncill resources, I more objective method of valuing 
his services mly result. This would tend to leave the decisions of how 
much patients vllue life Ind quaUty of Ufe in the hinds of the patient 
and his physician. If those who del1ver medical care Ire to be involved 
in I debate with those who PlY for it, Ind they most likely will be 
until resources Ire infinite, why not make the rules of thlt debate IS 
clelr as possible? let thlt deblte be bet ween the doctors Ind the 
pltient, Ind let's give the patient I professional unbilsed advisor and 
Idvoclte who needs to weigh his Idvice both economically end 
medicilly. 
The United Stetes is now spending approximately $2000 per year 
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for each man, woman and child on medical care.(Angel1-19B5) The 
Department of Health and Human Services reported the figure for 
1984 at $ 1580 ayerege for each person in the United States. 
Considering the primary care physician as a financial manager for 
1000 people at $ 1800 per year, (an ayerege fjgure between the two 
mentioned annualemounts) he would then have $ t ,800,000 to manage. 
I f a primary care physi cian were pai d 101 of that amount for 
providing primary medical care, and also acting as a finencial 
consultant on the use of those resources, he would be paid $180,000 
per year. Assuming an average overhead is 501, that would be 
$90,000 net income for the physician, which is Just slightly less than 
the average income for physicians in the United States. This, of 
course, has not taken into account the difference in age of patients 
and the difference In medical expenditure according to age. This 
example Is admittedly very crude in its monetary detail and is giyen 
only to introduce a general concept. If, howeyer, the income for the 
primary physician was not totally commensurate with his proYision 
of medical services, but also on the proYision of economic adYice and 
patient education, we could introduce an incentiYe for him to teach 
each of his patients ebout healthy life-styles end cost-effectiYe 
medicine. This change in his income incentiYes ·would enable him to 
offer a less biased approach to his decisions. The physician would be 
required to balance his recommendetion in terms of his patient's 
physical well being and his patient's economic well being. The cost 
benefit approach to medical cere seems more possible with the 
increased emphasis on the primery care physician. (Spiegel-1984) 
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Some physicians would have concern that It Is unethical to consider 
cost when caring for people. Ethicists think not (Jonson-1978) 
Mechanic expressed his concern about some of the current changes of 
health care financing that are shifting the physician's role from 
advocacy for the indlYldual patient to greater responsibility for fixed 
budgets. (Mechanic-198S) Placing the physician in the role of 
economic advisor to his patient and making that -fixed budget- his 
patient's budget would put this concern in a different perspective. The 
inevitability of fixed budgets seems obvious. 
The primary care physician'S reimbursement would be more 
neutrel as to the setting in which care Is delivered. The current 
system has introduced a strong bias for en in-patient setting with 
regard to physician reimbursment. Thi s change in pri mary care 
physician incentive .. combined with an insurance reimbursement 
system for hospi tal care whi ch wi 11 gl ye pat I ents i ncent i ye to ayol d 
that expensive care setting .. would tend to reduce the potential 
adyersartal role of the physician. If the physician were to make 
recommendation for a less expensive way of care .. the patient would 
not perceive the doctor as personally benefiting" as is the possibility 
in some of the current HMO·s. Conyersely .. if the recommended course 
was to follow a more expensive pursuit .. the patient would be less 
ltkely to perceive the physician'S incentives as being to generate 
income, than if in a strictly fee for service setting. His physician .. 
howeyer" could point out that the patient could benefit economically 
by choosing the more conservat i ye approach. 
Eisenberg ond Rosoff .. in an intriquing article on physician 
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responsibility for unnecessGry core, hoye mode some interesting 1egG1 
observations that may haye appl1catlon in this setting of a primary 
care physician acting In a role as economic adYisor, as well as 
physician to his pattent. In order to most accurately convey the thrust 
of their reasoning the author will quote rather extensively from their 
article. 
Compounding the leek of financial incentive for fee-for-service 
physicians to contain costs, the 11'&' currently places on doctors no 
legel responst blit, to see that services utilized ere economicall y 
justifilble. Traditional tort 1..., (i.e., malpractice) judges the 
phpician only on the medical correctness of the treatment rendered, 
not on its financial soundness. Thus, a doctor'tiho, in diaregard of the 
financial implications to the patient, provides or orders unnecessary 
servtces has no l1abtl1tv unless these services ca_ phgs1cal harm to 
the patient. 
A 1973 Pennsvlvalria case, 6J bert Ei nstei n Medical Center D . 
.LiJ!dL ill ustrates the situation. follM III her doctor's advice, • 
women spent nt ne diva in I Plriladel phil hospital for thlrapv for I 
peptic ulcer. SInce her doctor edYtsed her that hospttaltzatton was 
necessary, ahe vas understandebl, distressed 'tihen B1 ue Cross 
refused to PlY her hospital bill, claiming that utilization nMeY t.I 
concluded this care vas not -medically necessary.- Her attempt to 
hold her doctor contractua11 V liable for the cost of her hospitalization 
failed, the court holding that her claim founded in tort, and that ahe 
could reccmr onl V by provi ng that the doctor's treatment VIS 
medica11, unsound. That it vas economica11v unsound, in the optnion 
of the phVSictan's peers, vas irrelevant to a tort claim. 
Contrect lw, on the other hand, turns on the understanding of the 
parties to I given nlltton. If a particular doctor tnev that Ids 
pat1ent thought hi m to be matt ng economic 18 .... 11 • medtcal 
judlments in recommending treatment modalities, that understanding 
wuld become a part of the i mplted contract betYeen them. Manv 
courts and legel scholars regard the doctor-patient relation IS being 
pri menl y contract .. l. Such a characterization could be used bV a 
provress1ve court to fashion an impltctt contractUll obliaatton for the 
phVSiciln to practice economicall, sound medici De. Contract 1 .... thus 
provides a potentilll, more flext ble wenue than tort 1... for 
sti mulati ng the physician to consider the cost effectiveness of 
diagnosislnd treatment. 
CloseJ.., rellted to the expansion of contract J8'tt' responsibility ia 
the 1.1 doctri ne of -estoppel, - vhfch could Ilso be used bV courts to 
impose greeter ft nancial responsi btltty upon physicians. Estoppel 
_tea one penon Uabl. to another vhen, bV wrda or lCtione, he 
ca ... or klWlnglV permits another pe,..n to reI V upon hi m to that 
penonls dltrinnt. It doctor vho till ... his patient to u .. ,." a 
certatn tnetant, vhne hiving r ... n to believe thlt the patient t. 
relltng upon him to mete a lOulll economtc Judgment about thlt 
treatment, could be held liable for the conaeq .. nces If he did not, t n 
tict" mate Il£h I judgment. 
It third 1.1 appneeh to tnc""'ng phpietens' responstb11ttv 
for costs I. through the reptdlv expeoding coapt of 'nformed 
conaent.· Since the landmark 1972 decision of Ctnterburu y, S"p, 
_nv ItItes hive a,.. . tort-law ate .... nI that requtres tile 
phpietan to dltcl .. to MI patient In the information thlt the pati.nt 
wuld constder .. riel t n dectdl ng whether to u .. ,." the 
recommended trMtment. It Mnli tel V thlt patients consider the 
.... of thet r .. 1th-insurea coverage I flct8r materill to thet r 
"lth-caredlctatons. Thus" tile modern rule on 'nfor .... co ... nt,,· 
Ute the estop .. l .pproech" wuld require the doctor to dlxuss 
economic consequences of proposed treatment vith Ids petients. Tbit 
tile patient .. lid expreaalg liked for this informmon does ROt 
..... ril' relit¥e the doctor', obliQltion to provide it. 
( Et.n"I1-1978) 
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The Choice-Card concept would be expected to minimize the 
type of behavior observed in a patient for whom the author was acting 
as primary care physician. (Refer to scenano nine) In the Choice-Card 
plan, that type of surgery and work up would have been very poorly 
reimbursed by the insurance plan. He, as a participant, would have 
been instructed to learn from the surgeon, the diagnostic and the 
procedural codes to be used. A check on the insurance benefits in this 
particular instance would have made it clear that, if he elected to 
have the surgery, the greater portion of this cost would be borne by 
his discretionary or personal funds. The author feels that had his 
personal funds been used, his nonchalant attitude about the 
expendf tures woul d have been otherwi set Itt s a I so qui te probable 
that 1f he were aware of the need for his large personal contributi on 
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for the surgery, he would likely hove sought odvice from his primory 
core physlcion before proceeding. In thot eyent, the odyice would 
hove been thot the eyidence wos not strong thot he would be benefited 
by the procedure. The pr1mory core physicion would hoye been octing 
os 0 f1nonciol odvlsor ond 0 teocher of his potient, ond becouse he wos 
being poid on 0 copitoted bosis would hoye been oyoiloble without 
chorge to present th1 s adYi ceo 
This is different from the gotekeeper concept where the 
primory core provider con actually preyent the insurance company 
from paying for a service by not referring the patient or authonzlng 
the care. The physician also may haye a financial incenttYe to not 
make the referral ina gatekeeper arrangement. Thl s post t Ion of the 
primary care physician as an adyersary is a yery uncomfortable 
position for both. In the Choice-Card plan the primary care physician 
would not be able, ond would haye Httle financial IncentlYe, to 
preyent the pat I ent from proceedl ng. Hi s ob 11 gat Ion woul d be to 
clearly Indicate the potential risks and benefits, both financial and 
physfcal. The patient would indeed haye his chOice, but would need to 
occept the consequences. If the physl cf on recommended not to pursue 
a course which he felt to be a relatlyely ineffectiye use of his 
pattent's resources and the patient proceeded, the consequences to 
the patient would be financtal, a decrease in his discretionary fund. 
Choice-COni WOUld, in effect, be reversing the trend that Is 
presently observed in PPO's of the patient's paying a cap1tated fee and 
the physictan charging on a fee-for-service basis. This would provide 
for the patient to pay fee-for-service, except for his primary care, 
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and the primary care doctor to be capi tated in hi s rei mbursement. 
How the patients pay for their medical care and how physicians are 
peld are separeble issues. Not recognizing this has prevented us from 
developing innovative ways of paying physicians. (Mechanic-1985) 
I f a pri mary physi ci an was placed in the role of bei ng physi ci en 
and financial advisor to his patient, with less or minimal incentive to 
provide lab and x-rey facilities, this would provide an excellent 
opportunity for him to invest in the ability to provide computer 
assisted decision analysis for his patients. A computer decision is 
more consi stent and is not i nfl uenced by inadequate time, fat i que, or 
a recent unfortunate outcome of a similar case. We, as clinicians, 
allow our personal experl ence to j nfl uence us great I y. However, our 
personal experience may give us a perspective that is not in harmony 
with a broader view of the subject. (Gorry-1973) 
A physician speaking of cost containment says, ·We need to do 
this through our own involvement, for only we know where to apply 
ourselves to be most effective while interfering least with quality 
and essential services. Failure to take this step wjllleave us 
vulnerable to external forces which have different agendas and 
priorities. It is clearly up to us: (Zutdema-1983) It may be debated 
that only physicians know where to cut, but tt is certain that they 
have great expertise and that medical cost containment will not 
succeed wtthout them. It then seems imperetive that we strive to 
give appropriate incentives for them to be cost effective. 
It is very difficult for broad ranging political dectstons to have 
valid application to all individual circumstances. The best place for 
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exercising cost contoinment is when the indiYiduol physicion is 
worlcing with on indiYiduDl pDtient with D specific medicDl problem. 
Ginzberg hDS stDted thDt true cost contDinment Is D reduced flow of 
reDl resources into the heDlth CDre system without D diminution in 
useful output thDt would Ddyersely Dffect the sDtisfDction of pDtients 
or their heDlth StDtUS. (Ginzberg-19B3b) Does this not imply D 
slgnificDnt role for pDtient choice? 
The speciDU ty physiciDn could cont tnue to chDrge, as they do 
now, fee-for-service. The insurDnce fund reimbursement would be 
constderDbly different in mDny instDnces from whDt currently exists. 
The provider ts, however, not bound to Dccept the insurDnce pDyment. 
He needs only to conyi nce the PDt i ent to use hi s dl scret i onDry or 
personDl funds to meet the difference. In this bergDining position the 
pDtient will hDye Dccess to the Dssistence of his primDry CDra 
physiclDn for Ddylce, Dnd Dlso DS D negotlDtor for his deDHngs with 
speciDlty physlciDns. In scenDrio three the fDmlly physician would 
hDye hDd more credibility with the speciD11st if it WDS the pDtient's 
dlscret lonDry money used to pDy the unre8sonDb 1 e chDrges. 
It is commonly perceived by primory CDre physiclens thDt the 
chDrges of specialities Dra excessive. BecDuse insurence 
reimbursement most commonly PDYS speclDlty physlciDns' fees, the 
primDry CDre physiclDn hDS not hDd incentlYe, or been able to Dct in 
the interest of his petient by suggesting lower fees. Such difficulties 
Dre suggested in scenDrio three In the introduction. This expDnded role 
for the primDry cere physiclDns would give them some legitimecy for 
DdYOCDt I ng lower specl D 1 ty physi cl Dn fees. The role of D prt mary CDre 
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physician in assuring cost-effective care is also recognized by Rivin. 
CRi vi n-1 965) 
Enthoven has stated that fee-for-service reimbursement has 
the advantage of free choice of provider, but does not give the patient 
opportunity to benefit from prudent health care choices. (Enthoven-
1916a) Choi ce-Card woul d allow free choi ce of physi ci ans, 
fee-for-service, and the patient could also realize benefits from 
bei ng cost effective. 
The author has entered into thi s di scussi on of pri mary care 
physician reimbursement by capitation as a means of placing the 
physi ci an ina role as an educator for hi spat i ent. He thi nks thi s has 
merit, but may not be essential to the Choice-Card concept. If the 
primary care provider was paid on a fee-for-service basis it is still 
likely that his behavior would be altered by the cost consciousness of 
his patient. When a physician suggests, or as is more often the case, 
tell s hi spat i ent of the need to get a 1 ab or x-ray procedure, the 
patient's response may be different. With the insurance 
rei mbursement bei ng technology neutral, the patient wi 11 be trai ned 
to ask reasons for the physician's decision to do the study. When the 
physi ci an is aware of the patient's cost concerns and that hi s 
personal or discretionary funds will be paying for it, he may be 
willing to reevaulate his recommendation. This is observed presently 
when a physi cian encounters a patient who has no medi cal insurance. 
The current mi nd-set of physi ci ans is that most patients have 
tnsurence that is technology biased. Their usual approach is from 
that perspective and often have not establtshed ftrm grounds for their 
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recommendation. When confronted by a patient who does not have that 
type of insurance coverage, a physician win often find acceptable 
more economical alternatives to a previously suggested course. 
This same factor may be evident in the establishment of 
surgi cal charges. It is common that when a surgeon 1 earns the patient 
has no insurance, the fee is considerably lowered. Also, if the 
surgeon learns that a patient·s insurance pays a fee significantly less 
than his usual charge, there is possibly a fee reduction, or the surgeon 
may acccept the amount of the insurance payment. 
To make a more informed patient, and provide the basis for a 
good discussion and better understanding between doctor and patient, 
the patient should ottempt in his visits with doctors to hove the 
following questions answered. In relationship to diagnostiC studies 
these questions would be considered approprfate: 
_What information is hoped to be obtained by the study? 
_What are the rfsks inherent in the study? 
_What is the probabnity of getUng a posiUye test, assuming I 
do have the suspected di sease? 
_What are the implicaUons of the test missing my disease? 
_What is the probability of the test falsely identifying me as 
diseased? 
_What are the impUcations to me if I was falsely identified as 
diseased? 
_If the test wasn't done, what would you do in my case? 
_What are the implications of omitting the test now? Are there 
any problems that are of high probability from which we 
cannot recoup .. if passage of time should make the 
performance of the test more imperative? 
In relationship to a therapeutic course, these questions might be 
considered: 
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_What is the naturel history of the disease .. if no therepy was 
given? 
_What is the goal of the prescribed therepy? 
_What is the probabi 1 Ity of the therepy achl eyi ng the Intended 
goal? 
_What are the potential side effects or complications of the 
intended therepY,and their probability? 
_If I were to experience any of the side effects or 
complication myself .. would I still consider the therapy or 
operation to be worth it? 
EXPECTED I"PACT 01 "AJOR FACTORS .1 
"EDICAL COST CRISIS 
Techno logY:, A readi ng of the 1 i terature on medi cal cost 
containment seems to place expandi ng medi cal technology at the top 
of the list. (Moloney 1 979) (Lee-1978) Increased use of cltnical 
1 aboretory tests is due to the f 0 11 owi ng factors: (1) Advances in 
medical knowledge. (2) Increased insurance coverage. (3) Automation 
and increased convenience. (4) Positive financial Incentives. (5) 
Training, personaltty, habit, and sociel environment. (6) Defensive and 
preventive medicine. (7) Misunderstanding of test results by the 
doctor and the patient. (Flneberg- 1979) Showstack in his analysis 
of the medical cost crisis and the contribution of technology to the 
prob 1 em sai d: 
We YOuld caution against the Interpretation of tlris report as either 
an indictment of ph_cians VM OnMr procedures and testa or IS a 
suggestion thlt phgsicians should enrich themselves by i ncreast ng the 
number or tV" of .rvtces offend in their offices. The tntent of 
this report 1s to mate explicit for the purpose of public discusston of 
health policy, one of the mlnV factors that llld to the o,.ri ng of or 
the performance of medical care services. Tlris analpis ... not 
suggest that phpicians are paid too much .. but that the sptem by 
vlrich physicians' services are Y81ued needs to be considered in the 
niM of its effect on the deUwrV of medical care. The established 
relativities favor technology over personal care, laboratory 
utilization over phpician time.(ShoYatact-1978) 
Technology has become somewhat of a ·sacred cow· in the 
medical field. Third party reimbursement for technology and 
procedures had increased 501 from 1975 to 1978, while physician 
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reimbursement hId increlsed only 20S. (Abrlms-1979) This hIs been 
D yery strong i ncent 1 ye for physi ci Ins to enter the speci 11 ties wi th I 
procedurel orientlt 1 on. The current bils is to Issume new technology 
is beneficill Ind the burden of proof is to show thlt it is not. This 
should be reversed. (Robin-1984) 
In the Choice-Clrd concept there would be no insurlnce Plyment 
for I new technology untn criticll controlled studies hlye clelrly 
shown its benefits~risks~ Ind indicltions. A clelr eYllultion of the 
incidence Ind implicltions of fllse positive studies would be insisted 
upon. When Ind if reimbursement of I new procedure WIS decided 
upon~ the Ictull costs of performlnce Ind production of the 
procedure would be considered in determining the Imount of Plyment. 
Shllowitz suggests this 1n regard to the introduction of new 
techno logy. 
We recognize that AN technologV ... great impact on the heelth 
cere costs. HoveYer # one cost contai nment idee that I 'WOuld 11 ke to 
propose is that new pepers about new procedures and treatments 
should be published onl y Yith full deacri pt10RS of appropriate 
application and expected health beneftb and onlu if cost 1mpl1C1t1oRS 
Irt fullV dexribed. Disctmion should include expected effects on the 
system 81 a yhole 81 ,...11 as on i nd1vtdllll patient cert ~ the locus of 
treatment and the length of stay.(SbaIO'&lttz-1980) 
There is considerDble evidence that much of whIt we lelm from 
llborDtory tests even with sick patients~ screening aside~ contributes 
ltttle to pltient cere. Dixon Ind lezlo conclude thlt on the Iyerege 
only 51 of hospital laboratory tests altered pltient care~ or 
confirmed the existing course of therlpy. (Dixon-1974) A 
retrospective study in 8n emergency room setting (Bloomg8rden1980) 
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considered 32. of the loborotory tests to be unnecessory In cltntcol 
decision maki ng and 201 of 1 aboratory tests ordered were not 
considered justified on any grounds. A study by Meyers concluded that 
221 of laboratory tests were ordered unnecessart ly and 261 of 
nuc 1 ear medi ci ne studi es were ordered i nnappropn ate 1 y. 
(Meyers-1985) 
The at tempts descri bed in the 1 i terature to reduce ut t 1 izat i on of 
laboratory procedures have been largely directed at altering physician 
behavior. ( Fineberg-I 979) Some of the various methods used or 
suggested have been educational programs, (lawrence-l 979) 
financial risk sharing, (Eisenberg-I 978) cost auditing, 
(lawrence-1979) restrictions and rationing barriers, (Gray-l 973) and 
information systems. (Johns-l 979) Many studies conclude that 
physician behavior can be altered. (Schroeder-1973) (Martin- 1980) 
(Karas 1980) Alteration in behavior may, however, not be sustained 
unless constant reinforcement 1s present. (Eisenberg-1977) 
(Nelson-1978) (Rhyne-I 979) Efforts at constant reinforcement of 
physicians' behavior would undoubtedly have a cost and require 
consideroble effort. 
What would be a better, and a more constant reinforcement to 
altered physician behavior, than a patient who is cost conscious 
because it is hi s money that wi 11 pay for the tests? I n Carel's book on 
medical cost containment he states that 50 years ago physicians 
worried considerably about medical costs because the pattent was 
paying for it. (Carels -1980) If a physician was constantly reminded 
to be cost conscious by his patients asking some pertinent questions 
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concerning the expected benefits of the tests, what would happen? If 
the pressure to be cost conscious was being imposed by the patient, 
and not by the government or the third party insurer, the author has a 
strong feeling that it would be much more acceptable to the 
profession. Freyman talks about making the doctor to feel like the 
money that is spent by them is their money. (Freyman-1980) He, and 
others, have suggested that the doctors benefi t by thei r decreased 
utilization on behalf of the patient. Kosowsky has suggested that the 
reimbursers and the hospitals might share in cost savings from 
increased efficiency of laboretory tests. (Kosowsky-l 977) This 
implies that the doctor wl1l be profiting by ordering less for his 
patient. To many physicians this is a conflict of interest that is very 
uncomf ortabl e. 
It 1S pOSSible, that if when the doctor was ordering and doing 
less for his patient, he was also helping his patient to benefit in a 
financial way, this may be more acceptable to the physician. He 
would be required to balance his patient·s medical needs and his 
patient's finttncial interests concurrently. This may cause the 
physi ci an to be more accepting of 1 imi tat ions because they are 
imposed by the patient and the financial benefits of a limitation of 
service would accrue to the patient. As the repid changes of the 
procompetitive forces are upon us we are witnessing the prompt 
entry of entrepreneurs to medical enterprises. If 1t is generelly 
accepted that the insurence companies and entrepreneurs can make a 
profit from the delivery of less care, the author would find that a 
cause for concern. Even though the medical profession has not been as 
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efficient os would hoye been prudent in their response to the 
incentives of the post systems, his personol feeling ls that if 
entrepreneurs ond bi g busi ness gal n a substantial control of the 
medical care establishment, we will look to the past physicians as 
mere amateurs in manipulating the system to their own benefit. 
Unnecessary surgery is mentioned as a couse of i ncreasi ng 
medi cal costs and the reduction of such surgery as a means of cost 
contat nment. (Roos-l 977) (Moore-1985) Moore estimates that 
approximately 301 of the total dollar flow for health care goes tnto 
the surgical stream. In dollars this amounts to 85-95 billion dollars 
per year. (Moore-l 985) 
Eliminating unnecessary surgery is not as simple as it sounds, 
for many reasons. To begin with it is very difficult to define 
-necessary.- Pauly has written asking that very question. He states, 
.he problem, however, is not that the experts know what 
unnecessary surgery is and have been unable or unwi 11 i ng to 
communicate it, but that medicine as a discipline cannot generate 
either the conceptual 8PP8r8tus or the complete information 
set needed to arriYe at a general definition: (Pauly-1979) He 
suggests that the missing ingredient is a fully informed patient. The 
definition of -necessary- will be defined by each patient confronted 
wtth a choice. The ultimate decision will depend on the effect of 
the procedure on the patient's well-being. Who is better able to judge 
than an informed patient who win be considering the many variables 
of cost, risk, and benefit? The cost will not only include economic 
ones, but the risks of complic8tions end their ettend8nt cost in life 
74 
and quality of life. The probability of the surgery accomplishing its 
goal must a I so be consi dered. In consi deri ng the economi c costs, they 
should be considered from the perspective of what value would the 
money have to the pat I ent I f used to purchase other goods or servl ces. 
The questioning by the public of the physician's authority, and their 
appropriate use of modem medical technology, 1s healthy. It is not 
entirely in the domain of the physicians to determine what is 
necessary and appropriate surgery. 
As a reviewer of prior approval requests for Medicaid, the author 
has been caused to ponder the question of what is necessary surgery? 
How much do the patients really want the services offered them? 
Enthoyen has asked a related question as to how much the poor should 
be forced to accept their share of society's assistance In the form of 
costly medical technology? (Enthoven-l 918a) This Issue is posed in 
scenari 0 ei ght. 
Much I s expected of HMO's In reducl ng the amount of surgery. It 
is not entirely clear that they are capable of doing this. In an article 
by Luft, his data did not support the thesis that their savings are due 
to reduction in the amount of surgery. (luft 1916c) It is often 
supposed that the lack of fee-for-service in a closed panel HMO would 
reduce the frequency of surgery. Something not given much comment 
in the literature search to this point is the influence of the surgeon's 
desire to do surgery, apart from any economic benefit to him. 
Surgeons may be attracted to a surgical specialty because they enjoy 
working with their hands. This cln be generalized to 111 physicians as 
a desire to use the skins their treining has given them. (Goroyitz-
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1982) To distinguish from technicel zeel or therapeutic purpose cen 
be difficult for some physlciens. (Crewshew-1983) If the desire to 
utilize ones skUls were e strong motiyeting force leeding to the 
decision of the surgeon to operete, it would be unl1kely to differ in e 
f ee- f or-serYi ce set t I ng or e cepi tet i on system. 
Hosoital cere: It is estimeted thet 471 of the totel health cere 
doller wes spent on hospital cere in 1984. In recognition of this fect 
the government hes et tempted to reduce the expendi ture in thet aree 
by use of the ORB prospectlye peyment to hospitels. This is reelly 
Just enother way of trying to do whet peer review end decreasing 
length of stay wes to eccompl1sh. It is early yet end the totel effect 
of this payment method is not yet clear. There are those who expect 
that it wi 11 not accompli sh whet the government wants. John 
Wennberg is of the opinion that we would most impact the cost of 
hospital cere by concentrating on the admission to the hospital, 
instead of decreasing the length of stay or intensity of care after 
they are adml t ted. (Wennberg-1984a) He has documented the very 
significant Yariatlons in the rate of hospital1zation of patients In 
different Drees of the United States and In foreign countries. Aeron 
also has doubts thet the ORB's will be a pollcy success. (Aaron-1984) 
When the pat lent is admi t ted to the hospital for what may be 
considered legitimete reasons there Is the decision of what leyel of 
care should the patient heye? Here again the policies of third perty 
payers end the hospitals have encoureged the use of higher levels of 
care than the cUnlcal circumstances may warrent. If e physician, 
with e predisposition to be conservetiye with resources, were to 
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suggest to the pet 1 ent thet thl s 1 eve I of cere 1 s not requl red and 
would Incur unneeded expense .. the patient's answer Is usually .. -My 
insurance will pay for It.- Such an attitude Is typified In scenario 
flye. It is of Interest that in spite of how Jealously physicians guard 
their right to make clinical decisions without interference from 
outside forces .. that it is not commonly observed for a physician to 
ob j ect to bei ng to I d hi s pet i ent has to be treated in the I CU. Thi sis 
most likely because their reimbursment for care in the more intense 
set t i ngs is hi gher. 
That patients with chest pain admitted to the hospital to -nile 
out- a myocardial infarction can be adequately cared for without 
increased mortal i ty outsi de of the CCU has been demonstrated. 
(Thibault-1965) Treatment of acute myocardial infarction has been 
shown to be done at home, under some circumstances .. with success. 
(Ni tche 11- 1962) (Adgey-19B 1 ) I n the Choi ce-Card concept when the 
patients are aware of this .. and a contribution from the discretionary 
fund may be required, it is expected that they would insist on some 
yalid reasons why they should not be treated In a less expensiye 
setting. 
Terminal care: Anyone who has any contact with the medical care 
system will recognize that much effort and expense is deyoted in the 
life support of terminal and hopeless cases. The first concern with 
this Is that it causes pOintless suffering for patients and their 
families. To compound that concern .. it also expends significant 
resources that may heye a preferred use by soci ety, or a preferred use 
by the pet ient end the f emil y. Why heye we come to thi s di 1 emma that 
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has culminated In the courts with patients end femllies mertieled 
against hospi ta 1 s and doctors? Patients are now ref erred to as 
·prisoners in the ICU: (Annas-1984) The Choice-Card concept could 
help in minimizing this difficult medical-legal problem by involving 
the patient and the f ami 1 y more oct iye 1 y. That pati ents are concerned 
about these matters is evident in thi s statement of a nursi ng home 
resident: 
Pleeae. When III vital ai,ns s"'" the end is near unless Yer, dnstic 
measures Ire taken .. let us GO. Prolonginga1tfe for a person ybole 
mind end bod, DD longer function is en achievement for the physician, 
but dB 1St vounelves yhether IOU Ire doi AI the patient an, ti nd .... 
I hope that I von' be allYe anv longer thin I can Uve. But I vtll ..,t 
be dol AI the choosi AI ",hen the ti me comes.· (Armatrohg-1985) 
ObYiously terminal eyents, such as referred to in scenerio seven, 
would not be well reimbursed from the insurance portion in the 
Choice-Card plan and would require some choices made by the patient 
and f ami 1 y. The use of li vi ng will s may help in these ci rcumstances. 
What is life, and is it different than Hying? Is it life the medical 
profession is dedicated to preserve, or is it meaningful1iying? If it 
is meaningful1tfe that the profession is dedicated to preserve, who is 
in a better position than the patient to determine what is meaningful 
life? 
Medi cal mal Dract ice: Most di scussi ons of ri si ng medi cal costs 
include medical malpractice fears as a significant contributer. The 
cost of malpractice insurance to physicians of particular specialities 
is becoming prohibitiye in some cases. In the state of Florida and 
New York mal pract ice insurance for obstetri cians can cost in excess 
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of $75,000 per year. Obstetricians pay the most for malpractice 
insurance wi th 301 of them payi ng more than $30,000 per year. An 
est i mate of $ 15. 1 bi 111 on is added to the U.S. medi cal cost due to the 
malpractice threat. (George-1984) To others it is unclear how much 
of the ri si ng costs of medi cal care is due to def ensl ye medi ca I 
practice. (Tancredi-1978) The cost of malpractice insurance 
ultimately comes from the patient Yia fees charged for professional 
services. In the face of increasing cost for malpractice insurance, 
physician fees increase. The malpractice threat also alters the 
manner in which a physician approoches patient core. A defenslye 
posture is taken. An AMA sUrYey has shown that in 1984 an oyensl1 
421 of physicians took at least one meosure indicating an increase in 
the practice of defensiYe medicine. Thirty-one percent are 
maintaining more deta1Jed records. Twenty percent are increasing 
tests or treatment procedures. Seyenteen percent are increasing 
follow-up Yisits. Seyenteen are spending more time with their 
pat i ents.(AMA Center-1985) 
It 1s felt by some that the threat of medical malpractice is used 
as a scapegoat to explain the increase of costs. (Somers-1977) It is 
a 1 so noted that West Germany, wi thout the threat of mal pract ice, has 
had as much increase in the use of technology as the Uni ted States. 
(Rheinhardt-1976) Seyen billion dollars was the oyeral1 amount 
estimated by Health, Education, Welfare Secretary Caspar Weinberger 
for defensiYe medicine. (Weinberger-1975) 
As a backdrop for the medical ma1practice problem, we find 
unreol1stic public expectation and perception of what medical care 
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con or should do for people. The pubHc generolly does not perceiye 
the significant uncertainty surrounding the prectice of medicine. 
Results cannot be guarenteed. Many Yariables known, unknown and 
beyond anyone·s control are operating in the human organism. In our 
current system of medical care financing, the physician is placed in 
the posi tlon of stnvi ng to reduce the amount of uncertainty, the 
patient has little economic incentive to curtail costs, the providers 
tend to profit by doing more, and an attorney is potentially looking 
oyer their shoul ders. There is always one more di agnost ic test that 
can be done, one more therapeutic modality to be tned. If the entire 
burden of decision, as to whether additional technology is employed, 
rests upon the physician we can expect that uti1ization, with its 
resultant impact on costs, will increase. 
One of the integrel and novel features of Choice-Card is the more 
actiye involvement of the patient with his physician in the medical 
decisions regarding him and family. The pattents could share in the 
risk-tGking decisions Gnd have a finGnch,l incentiYe to minimize 
those dj agnost i c and therapeutic ventures most likely to be 
unproductive. This moy, in reality, expose the patient to less nsk. 
(Thlbaul t -1965) As our technology increases it has greater 
potential for harm. If there WitS a reduced incentive to employ these 
moda11ties in those settings where they offer so 11ttle, patients could 
benefit by less exposure to nsk and fewer economic burdens. 
Kaplan, in a discussion of the usefulness of preoperative 
laboratory testing, pOints out that if preoperative testing were done 
only for indications and became the medical standard, no legal 
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Uabt1ity should result from a compUcation attributable to an 
abnormality missed because testing was not indicated. (Kaplan-19B5) 
It Is argued that a more thorough cUnical evaluation and more careful 
clinical Judgment is required to make a decision not to use a test, 
than to order It. (Karas-1980) If the patient was aware of the 
reasoning that proceeded a decision to eUminate a test, and agreed to 
it in a setting where he would reduce his personal expenditure" this 
should decrease Uability for the physician. A legal decision rendered 
by Judge Learned Hand stated this principle. A failure to take a 
precaution did not constitute negligence if the cost of the precaution 
exceeded the probabiUty of loss without the precaution" multiplied by 
the value of the loss. 
Freud: A relatively new area of concern about the rising cost of 
medical care is shown in the areD of medical fraud. This usually 
involves providers who make freudulent claims for services not 
performed. Estimates of losses due to fraud range from 15 -45 
billion dollars per year. (Goldsmith-1985) Blue Cross and Aetna are 
increasing their efforts to detect fraud. Thirty five states now have 
MedIcaId fraud units. Employers are scrutinizing their employee 
insurance claim forms before submitting them to insurers. Other 
companies are rewording employees who find errors in their medical 
bills before they are filed. The Aetna Company considers the pollcy 
holder as the best source for detecting incorrect forms. If this be the 
case" the Choice-Card approach to medical care financing could be a 
significant influence to reduce fraud. This plan would require the 
recipient to review eoch cloim and to sign it os 0 verificotion that 
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services were given, and that he understood and agreed to the 
services. His motivation to do so would be that a portion of those 
cherges are going to be paid from his discretionary fund, or in some 
cases by an advance of credit charged to the patient. The area where 
fraud seems to be so preyelant is in laboratory and diagnostic tests. 
In the Choice-Card approach these procedures are the very ones that 
would be most heavily paid from the patienrs discretionary fund, and 
would therefore be the ones to receive closest scrutiny by patients. 
Preventive care and behayiorly related disease. Care of 
behayiorly related diseases would be less generously covered by 
insurance in the Choice-Card concept. If there was a free choice 
between yarlous medical insurance plans it would be possible that a 
self-selection process would occur. Those who realized their 
significantly reduced risk of disease, by avoiding alcohol and tobacco, 
may be attracted to Choice-Card by Its incentives. Those who realized 
that they were at risk of tobacco and alcohol related disease, and also 
at economic risk with ChOice-Card, may select the more traditional 
type of insurance. This WOUld, in effect, pIece the risk sherlng among 
those individuals of similar risks. As those at risk for alcohol or 
tobacco related disease tended to concentrate with the more 
traditional insurance, the premiums would also rise. The resultent 
cost rise would serve to give incentive to those non-users of elcohol 
and tobacco still in the traditional plans to look more seriously at 
elternate plans, such as Choice-Cerd. At its inception there would be 
a commitment to a given amount of money for en employee's medical 
care. This amount would be equivalent to the cost of en HMO premium 
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or a good policy in a traditional plon. An employer would contribute 
the same amount to the Choice-Cord enrollees as he would for any 
other plan. If those participating in Choice-Card by selectlye use of 
their resources in response to the bunt in incentives for economy 
reduced the cost of the insurance portion, the amount soyed would go 
to the discretionary fund, and not be reverted to the employer, 
insurance company, or proyider. It is possible that patients who use 
alcohol or tobacco, in response to these incentives, may be pursuaded 
to alter thei r behavior and become non-users. Even if they did not 
change their behayior, Choice-Card could be a method through the use 
of incentives and market forces, to place the cost of behayiorly 
related medical care on those who are at risk of those diseases. 
Administrative waste. This is an area of considerable 
expendi ture in the United states health care system but one that does 
not receive much attention as e contributor to rising health care 
costs. Bet ween the years 1970 and 1982 the number of heal th care 
administrators increased by 1711. In the seme period of time the 
number of physicians increased by 481. The total number of health 
core personnel rose by 511. (Statistical-1984) Any physician whose 
pr8ctice has spanned the yeers of rapid medical cost inflation can 
attest to the significant increase in his administrative costs. 
Himmelstein and Woolhandler have estimated that the total cost of 
heal th care edmi ni strat ion in the United States for 1983 was 221 of 
all spending for heelth care. (Himmelstein-1986) That would amount 
to 77.7 billion dollers. Of this cost, 15.6 billion dollars is for the 
administration of the priv8te health insurance progr8ms, Medicare, 
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and Medicaid. (Gibson-19B3) Most of the efforts which have been 
Introduced in the United States to control cost have required the use 
of more administrative personnel to insure that a reduced amount is 
spent on the care of people. This is because the system does not have 
any inherent forces to minimize costs. The author once read that a 
system was needed that would encourDge physicians to virtue and not 
to delinquency. (Cherkosky-1968) 8ecause of the basic defects in our 
system there Is Increasing tendency to monitor and to police, thereby 
i ncreasi ng the admi ni strat i ye cost. 
The apparent excesslye adminlstratiye costs of our system are 
cited by Himmelstein as an argument for a national health system 
such as Britain or Canada. They have significantly less admlnistratlye 
costs than in the United States. In Canada the cost of administration 
of the nat i ona 1 health insurance and hospl ta 1 adml nl strat Ion I s only 
61 of the total health care resources. A Similar figure is noted in the 
nat i ona 1 i zed Heal th Servi ce of Bri tai n. 
Choice-Card could have a favorable impact to reduce 
administrative costs. The anticip8ted reduction would be partly in 
the form of reduced collection costs for providers. The providers 
would be paid by the insurance c8rrier for the entire cost of a service. 
The collection of the patient's share would be done by the 
Intermediary. Because of the ability of the intermediary to obtain the 
patient share from the patient's discretionary fund, a good portion of 
the collection would be part of the insurance transaction. The 
collection of that patient obHgation that is a cash advance would be 
much easier because of the potential for patient's loss of Insurance 
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benefits in the event of their defoulting on the obligotion. The cosh 
odYonce could olso be collected from the future contributions thot 
come into the di scret i onory fund. I f this method of co 11 ect i on were 
elected, the transoction would occur outomoticolly os eoch monthly 
heolth core poyment comes from the employer. 
In the cose of the primory core physicion, who would be poid on 0 
copitotion bosis, the need for occounting, collection ond billing would 
be significontly decreosed. In Englond the physicion's office oyerheod 
is 291, (l1oynord-1975) os compored to on oyerheod in the ronge of 
SOl in the u.s. Si nce on i mportont responsi bi 1 ity of the primory core 
physicion would be potient educotion, some of the resources soyed in 
the collection ond billing could be directed to the occomplishment of 
thot goo1. As the potients were trained in the techniques of being on 
intelligent consumer of health care they would be able, and probably 
willing, to assume some administrotiye tasks such os careful perusal 
of the medical cloims for appropriateness and accuracy, thus reducing 
the need for policing activities. 
HEALTH POLICY A6ENDA FOR THE AHERICAN PEOPLE 
Another method of scrutinizing Choice-Card is to examine it in 
the light of the principles set forth in the Health Policy Agenda for 
the American PeoDle. As an explanation of this -agenda,- the 
following is quoted from the introduction to the jnterim report, 
February 1964. 
In 1982 the American Medical Assaciltioft initiated. project 18 luide 
health policg de¥elopnnt. Tie project--A Health Policg ..... for 
the American Pwtple( HPA) - - is • public effort 18 develop • 
long-term" consistent .pprw;h to health care issues facing t. 
nation. It is hoped thlt the HPA vin provide • common basis for 
i mtilti fig pngrems .... for respendi fig to soci.l .. a.mic .. scientific" 
educational .. and political cirtUmstalaS IS the, evolve. The HPA 
prwides .n oppertlnfty for • vide variety of people .... organizations 
to examine the foundattons .nd purposes of the American hellth cere 
sptem .... to develop .n ..... bIsed on common concerns and 
common understandings. Tlds interim report reflects the 
con.boretive efforts of over 350 individ .. ls .nd .pproximatelg 150 
OrpnizatiODS who hI¥e been ilMlwd in the process. Participants on 
six Wort Groups hive developed pri nci plea to luide pelicg 
development. Pri nci plea .re broad val .. statements of whit should or 
ougld to exist in • policg .reAl. They .re atetementa of the nat 
desirable cirtuntences or Iit.-tioDS and should help to ,oide 
individuals and organizations as they Db their decisions. 
As mentioned in the introduction to HPA there were she work 
groups: 
Work Group One was concerned with medical science and its 
premature appllcation. There is acknowledgment that new medical and 
surgical procedures have not been SUbjected to critical scrutiny. 
Choice-Card would require this as the basiS for being included as a 
benefit of the insurance portion. 
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Work GrouP Two. dealing wlth education of health care 
professionals, states that their education should include instruction 
In cost-effective health care. If the role of the primary care 
physician were expanded to include that of being a financial manager 
of his patient's health care resources this would give significant 
impetus for including this type of training. It would do little good to 
educate physicians in the delivery of cost-effective medicine and to 
have them practice in an environment that does not encourage it, for 
both patient and physician. ChOice-Card would support this principle 
by providing remuneration and incentive for physicians to practice in 
thet manner, and to so Instruct their patients who would also have 
incentives to be cost-conscious. 
Work Group Three addressed health resources, and I ts report 
states that technology should be used in the care of patients solely to 
achieve potentially meaningful benefit in health or quality of life. 
Choice-Card would support this principle by reimbursing poorly in 
those si tuati ons where expenditure of resources prolongs suff en ng 
rather than influencing health or quality of life. 
Work Group Four dealt with delivery mechanisms. Among the 
stated principles is that individuals have a right" and a responsibllity, 
to participate knowledgeably in the planning and implementation of 
their own health care. Free choice of appropriate health care 
providers is recommended. They suggest that heal th cere provi ders 
should playa major role in the provision and preparation of 
educational information for their patients. HPA also states that 
individu.,ls have a responsibility" and should be given incentives" to 
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act on the information about healthy ltfestyles for themselves and 
their families. Choice-Card will promote the achievement of each of 
these principles and will use one of the strongest motivators for the 
patient .. financial motiYatlon. When resources are finite .. it is stated 
that there should be a decision mechanism to determine what 
limitations should be imposed on the scope and intensity of services 
that are to be provided. It is acknowledged that there would be 
difficult decisions in this area .. that would have ethical implications. 
Choice-Card would approach the fulfillment of these principles by 
set t ing a monetary 1 imt t ayai 1 abl e .. structuring the insurance 
reimbursement in a manner to encourage cost -eff ect tYe uttlization .. 
and all owi ng a maximum expression of 1 ndi Yi dua 1 di scret ion in 
response to the unique aspects of their circumstances and their own 
personal preferences. By allowing maximum individual choice and 
expression within that framework .. we might be able to avoid the 
necessity of making some of these painful choices as a society by 
codifying government edicts. 
Work Group Fiye addressed eyaluation .. assessment .. and control. 
With economic resources being limited .. HPA states 3 basic factors 
shoul d be used in determi ni ng a 11 ocat ion. 1) That the we 11 bei ng of 
people be promoted. 2) People·s value choices and preferences be 
respected. 3) People be treated equitably. It is expressed that 
professionals should adhere to a code which assures that health care 
deci s1 ons are not made for the purpose of persona I or i nst i tut 10na I 
galn. This foregoing statement seems to call into question the basic 
concept of fee-for-service medicine and the current operation of 
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some of the HMO·s. When a provider is benefited according to the 
amount of service given, there 1s always a temptation to act for 
one·s personal benefit rather than the patients. It is felt that in an 
HMO setting, incentives to reduce overuttlization would be present. In 
an attempt to give incentive for reduced utilization some HMO·s are 
rewarding physicians with the money that the doctors do not spend on 
their patients for diagnostic studies and hospitalization. This 
practice would seem to especially challenge this principle of the HPA, 
related to medical deci sions being made without personal or 
institutional gain. Choice-Card would, In effect, give a series of 
checks and balances on the system. It could preserve a segment of the 
medical practice to the Incentives of fee-for-service, such as, 
personal gain that can be a source of innovation, increased 
productivity" and efficiency. Also" in the same system there would 
be a segment of the providers who Bre rewarded not by the amount of 
service given, but by the quallty o~ service given, as judged by the 
provi sion of primary medi ca 1 servi ces and on counsel as to the wi se 
expenditure of the resources allocated to his patient for medical care. 
Work Group Six developed the thought on payment for servi ceo 
Thi s aspect of HPA wi 11 be di scussed I n greater detai 1 because it is in 
thi s area that is the basi c thrust of thi s paper. The i ntroduct ion 
makes note that the patients and the providers no longer Interact to 
detenni ne the cost of the servi ceo It was f el t by many of the 
part i ci pants that 1 ack of pri ce compet It ion is a root cause of rapl dl y 
escalating costs. This work group developed the following principles 
which they fett should be guiding policy in this area. 
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1) The financing and delivery of health care should evolve through a 
process such that: 
.) 0 pluralistic system is ossured: 
COMMENT: 
Choice-Card could easHy exist in our current 
pro-competitive environment along with the troditional 
insuronce, prepaid systems such as HMO's, or with 0 voucher 
system and increose the plurolistic nature of the heelthcare 
system. 
b) price is detennined through en interoction between individual 
recipients of care or their agents; 
COMMENT: 
Choice-Cerd would proyide for 0 maximum of interoction 
of patient ond proyider in the detennining of price. A fee is 
set for the insurance payment of yarious procedures but thot 
fee may be significantly different from the usual insurance 
payment. The physicion is not obliged to accept the 
insuntnce p8yment as the complete p8yment, but must seek 
that agreement with the patient. Also acting as the patient's 
agent in the setting of price is his primary care physician. 
The insurer could still continue to act as an agent for the 
potients as in a PPO by identifying and jnfonning the 
patients of those providers who will 8gree to the proyision 
of services at a gi yen price. 
c) benefits for reimbursement of health care services ore 
determined through the interaction of purchasers. payors. ond 
their beneftctari es; 
COMMENT: 
With Choice-Card the beneficiary could choose insurance 
coverage to meet his individual preferences. -Cafeteria 
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style- of selecting benefits is en approach used by larger 
employers but more recently is being offered by smaller 
employers. (Galante-1986) This choice would include the type of 
providers that the patient will use. To maximize patients· 
choi ces and cost awareness~ the consumer should make choices 
at the time he purchases his medical insurance. These choices 
should be: What kind of health cere providers do I want to 
use? What kind of risks do I want to be protected from? 
What kind of services do I want to have? When an insurance 
plan is mandated by law to coyer all1tcensed proyiders the 
effect is to increase the premiums. Moral hezard effect is 
such that if a person who normelly would not use the 
services of a chiropracter has this included by law~ as a 
benefit~ and he hes e beck pain thet is slow to go away (as 
they often are), he may avail himself of the free, or at least 
highly subsidized, service. If he were required to pay for 
this service himself~ he would not be as likely to use it. An 
example of increased utilization of services, when introduced as 
an insurance benefit~ is noted from the experience of the United 
Auto Workers in Detroit. Podiatry coverage was introduced and 
in the first year the cost was B million dollars~ the second year 
cost 40 million dollars. The third yeer cost rose rapidly to 90 
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million dollors.(Goldforb-1983) 
This study did not toke into account the decreose in expenditures 
going to other provi ders who moy have previousl y been del iveri ng 
some of these services. EYen within the medico 1 profession one 
should be free to choose what specialty service he moy use. 
Mony people hove on oyersi on to. ond wi 11 not, use the servi ces of 
o psychiotrist. Why should they then be required to hove 
protection to poy for a service thot they wll1 not use? This 
concept would olso provide for patients to choose some 
specific conditions for which they would or would not like 
protection. bosed on their lock of need for coverage. If one 
does not use alcoholic drinks, he is not ot risk of olcoholism. If 
he is not 0 smoker. he is at negllgible risk of emphysema. If 0 
women hos hod 0 hysterectomy she will not hoye need for 
obstetricol coveroge. This concept would introduce, ond perhops 
redefine, the concept of insurance. One of the basic definitions 
of insurance is that you ore groupi ng together people wi th 
si mil or ri sks. Some consumers have on aversion to specific 
modolities of treotment, such os chemotherapy, ond hove no 
intention to ever use them. Shoul d they not be ebl e to purchase a 
heolth policy tailored to exclude a specific service they do not 
intend to use? Once a person has sel ected a medi col plan that is 
designed to cover his needs, that policy should be structured to 
give the consumer some incentive to be cost conscious at the 
pOint of service, as wen as at the time of health core insurance 
purchase. Choice-Card would do this. It mey be orgued that one 
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clnnot Inticiplte whit mly be their needs in the future. They 
mey indeed feel inclined to use e psychiatrist in the future, and 
In these circumstences could utilize their discretionary fund for 
this purpose. It should be emphasized egain thet if a person 
elected insurlInce coyerege with I smaller premium, this would 
leaye a larger amount to be pIeced in the discretionary fund. 
11) individuals heye the responsibility to provide payment or 
to COODerllte in enother peyment mechanism for the cere 
they receiye: 
COMMENT: 
In the Choice-Card system a patient's acceptance of D 
service and his signeture of Dcknowledgement will 
provide payment in full for the provider. EYen if e portion of 
the peyment must come from personel funds, the recipient 
hes obllgeted himself to the heelth care financing 
orgenlzetion, end not to the provider. 
e) SOCiety should pey for needed heelth services for those 
wi thout the resources to PeY; 
COMMENT: 
Choi ce-Canl coul d be ayai I abl e to the ci t i zens who ere 
uneble to peY by the use of e government voucher, such es 
they ere now usi ng for buy1 ng prepei d medi ce I cere wi th 
HMO·S. It could elso form the basis for an optionel method of 
financing medicel cere in e netionel heelth insurence, an 
option thet mey be more ecceptable to organized medicine. 
1) reguletion is sufficient to assure fair competition and access 
to health care servl ces; 
COMMENT: 
The Choice-Card would use internal regulation 1n the system 
that will more nearly implement the market forces, and 
minimize the need for external or government regulation. 
The confrontations and the di ff erences wi 11 be handl ed by 
the patient with his primary care physician acting as 
advocate for the patient. The patient would have an agent as 
he interacts wi th the speci a 1 ty physi ci ans that are i nvl ted 
to participate in his care 
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2) A market process should determine the balance between 
expenditures on health care (aggregate and per capita) and those for 
other goods and services. 
COMMENT: 
Choice-Card would maximize market forces in a manner not 
present in any plan with which the author's reading of 
current literature can familiarize us. A limit in total 
expenditure is set by a voucher. This voucher amount would 
be the maximum amount that an employer would make 
available for any other type of health insurance plan. The 
resources desi gnated for health care, I f conserved wi se 1 y, 
could be made available to the patient for other consumer 
I tems and therefore Introduce com pet itive forces for the 
money allotted for health care, as well as competitive 
forces bet ween heal th care provl ders, when the money is 
spent in the medical care sector. A system of financing for 
medi cal purchases in excess of the voucher amount 1 s 
included as a function of Choice-Card. This system could 
g1ye us very vital information as to how much the citizens 
value medical care. If with this system~ those involved were 
found to spend less than the voucher amount on medical 
core~ or if they spent more thon voucher omount by usi ng the 
credit feature~ this would help the notion to know at what 
leyel to set the voucher amount for those who may be 
part 1 ci pat i ng 1 n other systems I such as prepai d HMO·S. 
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3)Payment systems should encourege the cost-effective use of and 
de 1 ivery of health serYi ces wht 1 e ma1 nta1 n1 ng hi gh qua 11 ty care. 
COMMENT: 
Choice-Cord would identify those procedures which are 
shown through good scientific study to be effectiye. 
Payment by insurance for such procedures woul d be 
generous ~ as compared to those whi ch have not been so 
proven. If cost containment will require some reduction in 
quantity of service the area of reduced service should be 
in those are8S not demonstrated to affect quality. 
Cholce-C8rd would give incentive for this. 
4) Goyernment spending and taxing policies should encourage 
efficient production and consumption of health services. 
COMMENT: 
This principle hos lorgely been ignored in the post 
government po11cies. As a result of the demonstrated need 
for some control, the government is looking to a voucher 
system for the future. Choice-card would work yery nicely 
in such a goyernment plan. The speculated cap on the 
amount of medical insufance premium allowed to be 
tax-exempt would work in favor of the Choice-Cerd concept. 
95 
5) Payment systems and benefi t desi gn shoul d encoufage the use of 
preyentive services and the promotion of health. 
COMMENT: 
The design of Choice-Card would not provide good 
reimbursement fOf behayiorly related disease# such as 
emphysema and alcoholism. Participants who choose to use 
products known to be injurious to heal th would understand 
that the discretionary fund and personal resources would be 
required to coyer such problems. This would possibly act as 
an incentiYe for behaYioral change. If they were not 
encouraged to re li nqutsh such habi ts they may elect 
to obtain their health covenlge in a more traditional setting 
or an HMO. Those who real i zed thei r si gnl ficant ly reduced 
risk of disease by 8voiding alcohol and tobacco# may be 
attracted to Choice-Card. This would in effect place the risk 
sharing among those individuals of siml1ar risks. As those 
at risk for alcohol and tobblco related disease tended to 
concentnlte wi th the more tredi tiona 1 insurance the 
premiums would also rise. The resultant rise in premiums 
would serYe to giye incentiYe for those non-users of alcohol 
and tobacco # still in the tnldi tiona 1 plans # to look more seri ous 1 y 
at alternate plans# such as Choice-Canl. Thus Choice-Card could 
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be a possible way through the use ofincentiyes and market forces 
to place the cost of behayt orl y related di sease on those who are 
at ri sk for those dt seases. 
6) New and existing health care technologies should be evaluated 
for safety efficacy and economic impact to be eligible for payment 
system coverage. 
COMMENT: 
At the inception of this concept both existing and future 
technologies would be evaluated for re-imbursement 
purposes. In the presently established plans with precedent 
a 1 ready set, thei r projected course seems more 1 i Ice 1 y to 
include only the newly introduced technologies. 
7) Payment systems and benefit design should offer some options 
whi ch allow i ndi yj dua 1 choi ce of proyi der and of deli yery mode. 
COMMENT: 
This concept would anow a maximum of individual choice 
in terms of individual provider, type of coyef8ge, type of 
proyi der, and set t i ng for care. 
B) Benefi t desi gn and pGyment systems encoufDge conti nui ty of 
CGre. 
COMMENT: 
Continuity of CGre is becoming a particulGr problem in the CGse 
of some err~ployees whose employers require that they 
perticipGte in Gn HMO. The pGrticulGr HMO mGY chGnge from 
year to year, as thei r contract may be underbi d by another 
proyi der. Choi ce-Card is desi gned 8S 8 1 i f et i me system that 
is portable from one employer to another, thus Gnowing 
them to meintain the same physician, regardless of 
employer. This would be conditional on the employer 
offering the pI en. If it hed merket eppee 1 to peti ents it 
should be acceptable to employers, because it allows them 
to be commi tted to e given emount end not the open-ended 
provisions of the pest. One of the most serious defects of 
our current system of finencing medicel care is the strong 
link between employment end insurence coverage. Health 
i nsurence coyerege should be conti nuous. (Enthoyen -1918e) 
It is particulerly disheertening for e person, or family, 
to heye medicel insurence eyail eb Ie for yeers end be 
essentielly unused while employed; end then, 1n e brief 
period of unemployment, without medicel insurence 
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coyerege, have a significant medical problem. Meny studies 
would show thet en individual et time of the stress of 
unemployment is most yulnereble to illness ( Fleming-19B4) 
(R8he-1974) Choice-Cord could be of greet help in elleyieting 
thi s problem. As an example: a man had been employed and 
covered under the Choice-Cerd plan for fifteen ye8rs. In his 
discretionary fund he had eccumulated $2500. This money 
would be his when leoying his former employer, but still 
eccessi b Ie for only medi ca I needs. At th1 s poi nt of 
unemployment he would be oble to unbundle the Ch01ce-Cerd 
package end purchese only the skeleton besic insurence 
protection. He could then use his money 1n the discretionery 
fund to pay his premiums and not be vulnerable to the 
potent j ally huge bil 1 s of cruci a 1 medi ca 1 care. The average 
unemployed person remai ns so for onl y 2.9 months. 
(OEDC-1982) In the example we are now constdering~ 
after only 3 months of unemployment~ he would not deplete 
his discretionary fund and upon his re-employment could 
again participate in the full package of Choice-Card. If his 
period of unemployment was extended~ and the discretionary 
fund depleted~ perhaps at this point he could be extended 
credi t to purchase the basic I nsurance coverage. Another 
possibility would be to involve the government at this level 
and have them insure the loans for insurance premi um 
payment. A direct payment by the government of the premium 
would also be possible. 
9) Payment systems for the care of the terminally ill should 
emphasi ze concern for the qua 11 ty .of li f e. 
COMMENT: 
A particular aspect of Choice-Cant~ unique to it~ is the 
payment from the insurance fund for terminal illness to be 
based on probability of obtaining useful result in terms of 
quality human life. This would discounsge the expenditures 
of scarce resources to prolong dying .. rather to reclaim 
meaningful1ife. 
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10) Payment systems and benefit design should offer options for 
long term care and should provide incentives for the most appropriate 
set t i n9 8nd 1 eve 1 of care. 
COMMENT: 
Choice-Card has not addressed to this poi nt the provision of 
long term care~ but is not unique from other insurance pllns 
1n this deficiency. It would be possible~ though~ that 
indi yidua 1 s who were conserYat iye in their use of medicIl 
services could arrive at older age with a considerable 
amount of money in the discretionary fund with which they 
could purchase long term care. It is also possible to 
consider the linkage of money in the discretionary fund with 
long term care insurance. Thi s Is di scussed 1 ater in the 
section dealing with implementation. Long tenn care 
payment has fanen largely to the public sector 
Ind insurance for thi s setting of clre hIS not been 
available. Private insurance is being considered as a means 
of reducing the finlncill demlnds on public budgets. 
(Meiners-1982) ITresnowski-1985) (Hospitals-1985) A 
significlnt deterrent to private long term insurance has 
been 1 ack of inf orm8t i on upon which to base cost 
projections. (Meiners-1984) Meiners hIS estlblished some 
premium estimates for prototype policies and availablility 
of such coverage may be forthcoming. There is always 
concem for the moral hazard of insurance but this 
should be less in the coverage of long term care than in the 
acute care where drama and symbolism are much more 
prevllenl. It Is difficult to enYision promoters successfully 
appealing to patients by making a nursing home seem 
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at trect i yeo 
11) Payment systems should help support health professions 
education and some fonns of research. 
COMMENT: 
Choice card could support a type of epidemiological research 
that would be IYailable in no other way. We would haye I 
population of Individuals who may elect to abstain from 
some forms of medi cal therapy accepted as standard care 
by the rether authoritarian medicll eatabHshment, but 
which haye not been SUbjected to the careful scrutiny of 
controlled trials. Such trials would haye a difficult time to 
gain acceptance when the entire burden of decision rests 
upon the physicians. With the primary care physician 
being reimbursed on a capitation basis, one of his 
responsibilities would be to accumulate accurete 
epidemiological data on his patients. These data could be 
yery infonnative and benefit all of society. Bayer has 
i ndi ceted the need for such prospect i ye studi es. 
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(Bayer-1983) The possibilities for the use of these data when 
stored in computer data banks is just emerging. It is highly 
probable that it could contribute to a patient date base for 
predi ct i ng i ndi Yi dual patient prognosi s. 
SETTING FOR A TRIAL 
This concept is conceived in such a way as to be introduced in 
the procompetitive environment now existing in our society. It would 
require minimal interaction with government, only the IRS, to 
implement. The involvement of the IRS would be needed only to anow 
the money in the patient discretionary fund to be regarded as 
nontaxable until such time as it is withdrawn for expenditure for 
purposes other than medical care. If the IRS were not to rule this 
way, congressional action would be required. 
Possibly an ideal place for this to be first tested is in a large 
corporation that is self insured. In this setting, the provisions of 
ERISA would exempt the insurance portion of the plan from the 
mandated provision of the state insurance codes. This would allow a 
patient to choose coverage for the type of providers that he will plan 
to use. 
It is l1kely that no employer would want to develop this concept, 
or may lack the expertise to do so. It would be a very logicDl role for 
a large benefits or insurance company to develop this, and market it, 
DS a choice for employers to offer their employees. It is currently 
required by 18W thDt employers of D certain size offer an HMO option, 
if one is operating in their 8rea. If Choice-Cent were tried, Dnd 
shown to be successful in providing access to essentiDI CDre at D 
reasonable cost, there may be action to 81so require this plan as Dn 
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option. If, howeyer, it had appeal in the market place to employers 
and employees it would require no legislatiye action. 
Assuming this plan was accepted and demonstrated to be 
effectiye for a significant segment of the population, would it haye 
application for Medicare patients? EnthoYen has introduced a 
consumer choice health plan.(EnthoYen -1978a) He pOints out the 
open ended nature of the goyernment's obHgation for medical care and 
its i nabi li ty to control costs. Hi s proposal is essent 1 all y a youcher 
system by the goyernment with the patient choosing between yarious 
options; usual insurance, HMO, PPO, etc. If they chose a plan with a 
cost less than the youcher amount, the surplus could be theirs 
immediately. Choice-card could easily be an option along with the 
other plans. Enthoyen enYl si ons hi s idea of consumer choi ce as a 
basis for National Health Insurance. The choice that he would anow 
consumers would be to select among yarious plans. Choice-Card could 
be one of those options and would allow eyen further choices for the 
patient who wos desirous of significant input into his health care. 
Physicians would be more likely to accept a National Health 
Insurance inyolying Choice-Card because it would allow priyate 
practice, fee-for-service, reduce the pressures for group and 
corporate practice, and put the pressure for flscal restraint between 
the patient and the physician, and not dictated by the goyernment or 
insurance carrier. Enthoyen's plan would require that there be a cap 
on goyernment expendi ture set by the amount of the youcher. In an 
address to the Utah State Medical Association in Salt Lake Ctty on 
September 26, 1985, Mr. McCloin Hoddow, Acting Assi stont Oi rector of 
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Heelth Cere Finenclng .. steted thet the federe) government Is moving 
to the use of a voucher system in the finencing of Medicare. 
As this concept deyeloped the euthor hed origlnelly thought that 
Mediceid patients would not be likely ones to perticipete in this type 
of heelth cere finencing end delivery system. At this point he 1s not 
so convinced of thet. With the help of e primery cere physicien, well 
treined in cost effective medicel cere, Mediceid petients mey, in 
reality, be some of the most motivated people to watch carefully 
thei r expenditures on medi cel care .. when given the al ternatl ye use of 
those resources for other consumer items. Presently there Is a 
concerted effort to enroll Medi cei d pati ents in prepai d HMO·S. There 
is one interesting recent report concerning health outcome in en HMO 
setting. This is from the continuing study by the Rand corporation of 
HMO's compared to traditional fee-for-service with varying degrees 
of patient cost shari ng. The most recent report looked at heal th 
outcome.(Ware-1966) The suggestion is .. that low income, high health 
risk patients have a poorer health outcome in an HMO set t i ng than do 
higher income people. It is of interest that the low income people did 
well from a heelth outcome stendpoint when in e cost sharing 
situation. If this finding were conSistent, it could be on indication 
that a system like Choice-Card would have applicability to the 
Medicaid population. 
I HPLEHEIT ATION 
To thi s poi nt the di scussi on has been on a theoret i ca 1 basi s. 
Attention will now be turned to the practical aspects of 
implementing this concept. Admittedly, there are some formidable 
probl ems and cha 11 enges. The author does not persona 11 y haye the 
expertise to know how this would best be done. Input from many 
disciplines will be necessary. The strengths of this concept 11e in the 
i ncent i yes gi yen the pat i ent and the proyi der and the proyi si on of 
maximum choice for patient. This is an idea and concept born out of 
the concerns created ina pract it i oner of medi ci ne as he observed the 
physicians and patients responding to the incentives of the past 
system and the significant changes of recent years. Perhaps some 
wl1 1 f eel thi sis not a pract i cal approach. To others perhaps thi s 
writing will stimulate thinking toward more significant 
involvement of patients as we seek a solution to the cost of medical 
care. Patients may haye somethi ng to contri bute, but ina di ff erent 
way than proposed herein. If efforts in this direction are not 
considered and tried it may neyer be known what role a knowledgeab1e 
and inyolved patient can play in our efforts to maximize the value of 
hea I th care expendi tures. 
There is much epidemiologicDl reseDrch available and much will 
be forthcoming to help us in making cost-effectfve decisions. We are, 
howeyer, lacking a system of incentives for both patient and 
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proylders to act on this infonnDtlon DS It Dpplies to the indlYldual 
patient. If agreement could be reached that the objectives and the 
incentives of Choice-Card are desirable and appropriate; it is hoped a 
commitment of the expertise and resources could be made avail obI e 
to proceed to implementation and trial. There would be problems, and 
mistakes would undoubtedly be made. These should be looked upon as a 
means by which refinement of a basically sound concept could be 
accomplished. The cost of developing a more reasonable approach to 
fees paid by insurance could be significant. Howeyer, that cost should 
not be attributed only to the development of the Choice-Card concept. 
This is something that is needed for the entire health care system and 
is being pursued by other investigators. What may be learned and 
observed in the development of Choice-Card could, and should, have 
application elsewhere. 
Assuming that a commitment of a given amount of money 
(voucher) is given for each patient when a trial was ready, the first 
step to take would be the development of a benefit and fee schedule 
f or the i nsurence port Ion. Because of the evidence of much 
i nappropri ate ut il i zot t on of di agnost I c studt es and the perverse 
incentives given to providers, diagnostic procedures would not be a 
benefit of the lnsurence fund. This would make it unnecessary to 
deye lop a fee schedule for all of the procedure codes in the laboratory 
and rediology areas. Howeyer, it would be helpful for the patients to 
have some information as to whIt may be a more realistic price for 
some of these procedures. Some di agnost ic procedures are very 
expensi ye I such as coronary angiogram find magnetic resonance 
106 
imaging. For these~ some insurance participation would be 
appropri ate usi ng both a patient deduct i b 1 e and cost shari ng to 
cont i nue cost consci ousness on the part of patient and provi der. For 
those pati ents who may have chroni c diseases and may requi re 
increased and prolonged usage of laboratory tests~ greater 
participation on the part of insurance should be allowed. This would 
then give incentive to improperly use the diagnostic codes associated 
with the more generous laboratory reimbursement. 
There are certain diseases where it is very clear that we can 
reduce future health problems and expenditures by diligent medical 
followup and aggressive treatment. For these types of problems an 
insurance program should be very generous in paying for the frequent 
outpatient visits and the cost of medications. As an example of 
these, I would give hypertension and diabetes. When submitting a 
claim for services, in the Choice-Card concept, the payment would be 
based not only on what was done, but the clinical diagnosis as well. 
With the diagnostic code and the procedural code used to arrive at a 
payment by the insurance company, there is a risk of manipulation of 
the diagnostic codes by physicians. Many of the diseases that would 
be noted as more reimbursable would be those such as diabetes, 
hypertension, and some cancers. These diognoses also have an 
adverse effect on patienfs insurability for life insurance. If this 
information of medicol importance were available to the life 
insurance componies, and such knowledge could lead to unfavorable 
life insurance consequences for the patient, such information may 
minimize the incidence of improper reporting of diegnoses for 
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medical care reimbursement purposes. The combining of medical l life 
end disabi 1 i ty insurance into one package wi th the same company 
would provide some checks and balances to the diagnosis 
manipulation. The use of the pr1mery care physician as e provider of 
care on a capt i tat i on basi s I rather than f ee-f or-serYi ce I may tend to 
reduce the tendency for diagnosis manipulation. It would be possible 
to increase the capi tat ion fee for care of a patient when a di agnosi s 
of diabetes or hypertension is made. 
Physician fees will have to be individually determined. This 
could be done by going through the CPT prepared by the AMA and a fee 
given to each code number. The question of who will determine thisl 
end in what waYI is a logical one. Many options for physician payment 
are under stUdy (CBO-1986). The first step I would propose would be 
based on resource costs. Some interesting work along this line has 
been done by Stason. An example of what hi s eva 1 uat i on has shown is 
in the CBO stUdy. Coronary artery by pass surgery would be $1200 for 
surgeon fee compared to $3000 as an average allowed amount by 
Medicare. For pacemeker imp16ntetion $1060 is the average allowed 
amountl but $256 would be the cost based amount. Cataract surgery 
would be $150 based on resources costl whereas $1100 is the average 
amount allowed by Medicare. 
Another factor to be considered in arriving at the surgical fee 
would be epidemiologic evidence of small area v6r1etion in frequency 
of the procedure. Research done by Doctor John Wennberg and others 
could form the basis for these determinations. 
Cosmetic implication of a procedure would also be considered in 
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determination of a fee schedule. Cosmetic procedures are often highly 
sought after especially when highly subsidized by insurance. That 
these procedures ore of a lessor priority is generally conceded. It 
was in this area that insurers were first to decrease benefits when 
the cost concerns emerged. It is for thi s reason that it is suggested 
as one of the factors to be considered in establishing a fee from the 
insurance portion. Consensus of the demonstrated effectiveness in 
achieving the intended goals of the procedure as determined from 
epidemiological studies and also from physician survey would form 
the basi s for thi s determi nat ion. 
In making the f1nel determinetion of a fee a penel of physicians 
from various specialties and general physicians would be used to 
determine the categories appropriate for eech procedure. It 1s not a 
content ion that thi s woul d be a perfect system or that the determi ned 
fees could not be disputed. It is contended~ howeyer~ that it would 
represent an i mproyement oyer the current system where the fees are 
set by historical aCCident, precedent, and political influence. This 
would attempt to set some priority in a systematic way. The fee paid 
by the insurance portion is not a bi ndi ng one on the provi ders ~ but 
must be agreed upon by he and the patient. The chart grid (Table 1) is 
an eX6mple of how the V6rious factors could be integr6ted to arrive at 
a fee. 
The capitation fee for the primary physician also would need to 



















RH INOPL ASTY 
TII!Je I 
A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO DETERMINING 
FEES PAID TO PHVSICIANS BV THE 
INSURANCE FUND 
RESOURCE EVIDENCE FOR DEFICIT OF COSMETIC 
COST SMALL AREA EV IDE NeE FOR IMPL IC AT IONS 
BASED FEE VARIATION EFFICACY 
0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + 
+ + + + + 
+ + 
$150* X X X 
$1200* X X X 
$1200** X X X 
$1100** X X X 
$1000** X X X 
$25€.* X X X 













FOR EACH (+) IN THE PRECEDING EVALUATION GRID A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE COULD BE 
SUBTRACTED FROM THE RESOURCE COST- BASED FEE. IN THE ILLUSTRATION A 10~ 
REDUCTION IS USED. IN THIS EXAMPLE EACH CATEGORY IS WEIGHTED UNIFORMLY J BUT 
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ASSIGN DIFFERENT WEIGHTS TO EACH. 
* FROM ST ASON: PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT UNDER MEDICARE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF ICE 1986 
* * AUTHOR'S EST 1M ATE 
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Several factors should be considered such as age, health status, sex 
of the patients. The HMO's would have access to helpful information 
on capitation but their figures are more frequently in reference to 
total health care capitation, whereas, this concept involves a partial 
capi tat i on. Some HMO's are usi ng thi s form of part i a 1 capi tat ion. 
(Anderson-1986) This is not a frequently mentioned concept in the 
literature. Health Insuring organizations contracting with Medicaid in 
Santa Barbara County and in Louisville are using this concept of 
part i a 1 capi tat ion. (Heusch 1 er-1985) 
In order to arrive at a capitation fee, the scope of services would 
need to be defined. Perhaps some basic and simple laboratory tests, 
such as urinalysis, CBC, pregnancy tests, and strep screens could be 
included in the capitation scope of benefits. This would assure that 
these most frequently used studies were avotlable for potient 
convenience and because these are some of the more frequently 
performed tests may tend to reduce administrative costs of billing 
i ndi Yi dua 11 y for these procedures. Because a pri mary care physi ci an 
might be tin internist, and many famny physicions tire not now doing 
deliveries, it would not include obstetrical care in the capitation 
scope of benefits. If a family physician desired to do the deliveries, 
he could charge on a fee-for service basis. Responsibilities of the 
primtlry physician for inpatient care would need to be defined. 
Because of capitation there may be incentives to refer inpatients 
to speCialists. There would be, however, an economic incentive for 
the patient to have the primary physician provide inpatient care. The 
primary physician would have incentives end pressures thet ere 
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counterba 1 anci ng. Physi ci ans have i ncent i ye to use the ski 11 s of thei r 
troi ni ng, and by thl s i ncent i ye woul d tend to retai n care of the 
patient. Primary physician reimbursement would, how eyer .. reduce the 
economic incentives to mtJintain the patient ctJre beyond his 
capabilities. EYen if the leadership role of inpatient care was 
transferred to a consultant there would be an expectation by patient 
and the insurance organization that the primary care physician remain 
actively involved. This would allow him to monitor the care in terms 
of cost effectiveness and be involved in assisting the patient in his 
medical ctJre decisions. Since the primary physician income is not 
based solely on a fee-for-service he would not have the economic 
pressures to abandon the hospi tal patient to the total care of the 
conSUltants. 
With primDry CDre ayailDble to the p8tients without charge, a 
potential for abuse would exist. Several ways could be used to avoid 
this 1f it beCDme a problem. Possible methods would be, a co-ptJyment 
per visit, institution of a co-payment after tJ given number of visits 
per month, institute a full charge for excess visits. Such 
·unnecessary· visits could be an occasion to involve the petient in 
some educ8tion on utilization. These det8ils would need to be clearly 
defined in the contract. 
Educational benefits and requirements would need to be defined. 
These would be general educational efforts and specific disease 
oriented educational endeavors. With both patient and physician given 
incentives to be cost conSCiOUS, educational activities aimed at 
effective prevention would be given a high priority. 
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Audio and video facilities may be required for patient use. 
Perhaps there should be some requirement for patient part i cipat i on in 
selected educational SUbJects. Areas of special emphasis would be 
drug abuse (alcohol" tobacco and street drugs)" sexually transmitted 
disease and sexual behavior and its implications for health. Some 
SUbjects and topics may be dealt with by group discussion allowing 
patient interaction. 
Hospital payment would be by DRS (case bosed). Included as 0 
factor in fee determination would be consideration for small area 
voriotion of admission frequency for thot diognostic code. A severity 
of inness foctor" and I foctor indicating the likelihood of the illness 
being behoyiorly reloted" would olso be included. Table 2 is an 
illustrotion thot moy be helpful in understonding how this would be 
done. 
If the currently used DRG poyments were used" which ore based 
on past chorges" it would tend to propogote the inequities of the past. 
It would be preferable if resource cost bosed DRG poyments were 
ayailable" but these are not presently obtainable. The percentages of 
poyment added or subtracted by the yorious considered factors ore 
6rbitrarily selected. This could be chonged as new infonnotion 
become aY6ihlble" which would indicate the wisdom of a ch6nge. In 
the above eXlmp I e" a 101 amount is subtracted from the DRG poyment 
for each (+). An exception to this is in the severity of inness 
cotegory. The number three level is considered the overage and 0 10. 
omount is odded for eoch (+) obove ond 101 is subtracted for each (+) 














APPENDIC I TIS 
T6ble.2 
A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO DETERMINING 
AMOUNT PAID TO THE HOSPITAL BV 
THE INSURANCE FUND 
ORO EVIDENCE FOR SEVERITY OF DEFICIT OF 
PAYMENT SM ALL ARE A ILLNESS EYIDENCE 
VARIATION 1 2 3 4 5 OF EFF IC ACY 
0 + + + + + +++ ++ ++ 0 + + + 
+ + + ++ ++ + ... 
+ + + 
$16150 X X X 
$4040 X X X 
$8050 X X X 
$16150 X X X 









below that leyel. Work on the severity of illness and DRG variance 
has been reported by Brewster. (Brewster-19B4) Other categori es 
could also be added as deemed appropriate. One such category that 
may be considered could be called relevance. How relevant is a 
medical degree to the performance of upper G.I. endoscopy? How 
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re levant is a medi cal degree to the performance of cataract surgery? 
lsi t possi b 1 e that a person very dexterous coul d be trai ned to do 
some of these specific tasks without the necessity of complete 
medical training? Certainly these should be done by a fully trained 
specialist, but how critical is the complete medical training to the 
actual performance? Thi s is not adyocat i ng that these procedures be 
done by someone other than a medical doctor. Only that we recognize 
that some of the procedures which fall in the province of a certain 
speci a 1 ty are in real i ty techni ca 1 maneuyers, perhaps not requi r1 ng a 
medical degree. The medical training is necessary in the appropriate 
evaluation of the indications for the procedure,and the evaluation of 
the di sease in the context of the i ndi Yi dual j nyo I yed. The systems of 
the past have tended to overvalue procedures and depreCiate the 
cognitive skills and jUdgement that only medical training can 
provide. 
When the basic research was done to assign a fee to each CPT 
code and DRS category, an approach to an insurance company could be 
made. The fixed fee should make the actuarial task easier as 
compared to the open-ended system now used. When given the 
proposed number of people insured and the fixed fee of insurance 
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obligation, the per capita cost of insurance could be projected. When 
this was available, by subtracting the insurance cost from the annual 
voucher amount, the amount available for patient discretionary funds 
coul d be obtai ned. 
The insunlnce contrect would provide that excess profits would 
revert to the patient discretionary funds. This would be essential 
because if utilization was significantly decreased a windfall profit 
for the insurence company could be seen. It would be expected that 
the original insurance bid would be based on the industries past 
utilization rates. The insurance company would be at risk and no 
assessment of the discretionary funds would be possible. It would be 
essential that this insurance fund be completely separate from any 
other indemnity insurance provided by the company. 
The question of rei nsurance must be addressed. An inc 1 inat ion is 
present to prohibit such. Howeyer, one of the basic premises of this 
concept is freedom of choice and a prohibition of reinsurence would 
not be consi stent. When one analyzes those thi ngs for which a 
supp lemental insurance would be obtai ned there are procedures and 
situations where utilization has been high and with high priced 
procedures. The expectation would be that a supplemental insurance 
would be prohibitively costly for most people. Also, those who would 
be electing to use this Choice-Card 8ppr08ch would be people who 
were convinced that our present system is excessive and would be 
wanting to re8lize the savings for themselves. To purch8se 
supplemental insurance would only propagate the systems from 
which they would haye turned. Supplemental insurance would not be 
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encouraged and certai n 1 y not be offered wi thi n the operations of the 
Choice-Card concept. 
When the amount of money entering the discretionary fund was 
determined .. attention would be giyen to the use and operetion of that 
fund. One concern about the fund is how the patients may Yiew the 
money. It would be drewing interest to their benefit .. but win that be 
sufficient to cause them to use it prudently? At least one lady with 
whom this idea was discussed would feel and act as if it was hers. -'f 
that is my money .. I want to haye it and put it where it will drew the 
most interest .. - was her statement. The pooled funds of the patient's 
discretionary money could form the fund from which personal medical 
advances were financed. This could pose some problems in terms of 
interest retes charged and interest retes earned by the fund. There 
could be a segment of the participants who may be motivated to get 
maximum interest on their money .. such as the young lady mentioned 
earlier. Others may feel that money borrowed for medical care should 
be at a low interest rete. This could present some political problems 
among the participating members. This could perhaps be solved by the 
participants electing at the time of their enrollment as to which 
philosophy they would want to fonow. Those who wanted high 
interest could elect for their money to be pooled 6nd invested in 
money m6rket or other funds for a maximum yield with the 
understandi ng that if they were to borrow any money for medi cal care 
that it would be financed 6t the market rates perhaps through a 
medical credit card company. Those who elected to haye low interest 
money available to fin6nce their medical care would do so with the 
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understanding that their discretionary fund would be drawing an 
interest rate that was near the rate that they would be charged. If the 
discretionary fund were used to fund the cash advances for medical 
care this would create some concerns for the solvency of the fund. 
It is proposed that any amount in the fund above a given minimum 
will be available for nonmedicel uses. When the fund is neer or above 
the minimum, patient beheYior may be different than with the fund 
significantly below the minimum. When a trial of the concept was 
made it woul d be interesting to use a duel approach wi th regard to the 
discretionary fund. One group would start with a zero amount. The 
other group would be given some seed money for their fund, nearly 
equi ye lent to the mi ni mum amount requi red for personal wi thdrawa 1. 
This would moke the patients more immediately able to take personal 
adYantege of cost effective usage of their discretionary fund. The 
difference in beheYior of the two groups could be studied to learn if 
the one group were more motivated to cost effective behavior. For 
those given the benefit of the seeding money, we need not regerd that 
8S 8 perm8nent gift. A given 8mount could be withdrawn 
eutomatically eech month. At a given period of time, the 
discretionery fund seeding would have been repaid and only the 
petient's own money would remain. 
The 1 eye 1 at whi ch a pet i ent coul d wi thdraw for personal 
expenditures would be determined best by input from insurence 
compeni es wi th experi ence on average patient usage for di agnost i c 
tests. The chellenge here would be to essure thet sufficient is 
eyellable for the patients elected medical needs, but also to have 
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sufficient in the discretionery fund to stimulete e choice in the use 
of the money. Set t i ng thi s 1 eye 1 woul d edmi t tedl y be erbl trary until 
such time es sufficient experience with this concept was obtained. 
Beceuse the usege of medi ce 1 servi ces is genera 11 y i ncreesi ng wi th 
ege, the minimum leyel would prudently be increased with increasing 
ege. This could be done eech yeer or in increments of yeers, such es 
2, 4, or 5. 
The concept includes portGbility of the fund so es to not lose 
incent i yes for wi se usege by those peopl e who mey chenge employers 
wi th some frequency. I n the cese of those who mey heye e seeded 
fund it would h8ye to be cle8rly defined to exclude port8bility of the 
seed money. To discourage people from chenging to e different type of 
insurance, for the purpose of using the discretionery funds for 
nonmedicel expenditures, it could be required thGt G minimum period 
of time be stated for yest i ng th8t woul d 8110w portabi 1 i ty. Any money 
in e discretionery fund below the minimum required would not be 
eY8i 18b 1 e for 8ny nonmedi ce 1 purch8se, eyen though the subscri ber 
mey heye disenrolled end heye enother type of medicel coyerage. Use 
to pey for heelth insunance premiums would be considered e medicel 
use. If thi s concept were used in e net i one 1 heel th insurance, 
chenging of employment mey not pose the concern with reg8n1 to 
portGbi 1 i ty. 
One of the prime objectiyes in the choice-cent epproech is to 
ceuse the pet i ent end the physi ci en to be ewere of e 1 ternet i ye uses 
for the money th8t is spent in nather m8rginelly effectiye weys, 
especielly in illness th8t is terminel, such 8S cencer. The linking of 
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some term life insurance with the discretionary fund leyel would tend 
to require some evaluation and thought before embarking on a course 
which has minimal or no chance of curing or improving quality of life. 
The example of surgery in the mother with cancer of the ceacum 
referred to earlier in scenario seven would be an example. Using Hfe 
insurance purchased on the basis of the amount in the di screti onary 
fund would anow for some leverage of the money. In this way a 
decrease of $100 in the discretionary fund could be a decrease in 
thousands of dollars in death benefits. Death is a tragedy under any 
Circumstances, especi all y when it is a parent on whom a family 
depends for income and support. It is of concern to many observers to 
witness large sums of money expended in futile efforts or very short 
term prolongation of a miserable existence. Then after the 
i nevi tab 1 e has occurred the f ami 1 y may be indebt and wi thout a 
source of family income. This linkage of life insurance could allow a 
way for a father or mother to divert money from a useless and futile 
endeavor to a means of support and a degree of economic securi ty for 
a bereaved family. This life insunance variation approach could be 
mandatory or optional. If it were optional, there could be problems 
with trying to obtain coverage when it was determined that a person 
had a Hkely terminal inness. 
Disenrollment procedures would need to be clearly defined. 
Anyone who entered this would need to be educated and it would take 
time for them to leem the system. It would require a fairly 
si gni f i cent amount of trai ni ng and education of the patients for them 
to make a choice as to their desire to participate in the first place. A 
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minimum of one year, and perhaps more, should probably be required 
before disenrol1ment is permitted in most circumstances. Such 
requirements are often used in disenrollment from an HMO. 
SU""ARY 
That there will be some control of medical cost seems to be a 
foregone conclusion. The Question of those who will control cost is 
less clear. The current political environment is favoring a 
pro-competitive solution. Medical care is not inherently adapted to 
the marketplace forces because of its unique consideration in SOCiety 
as a right, and the lack of the patient as a knowledgeable consumer. A 
review of the cost-containment literGture has very little comment 
about the role of the patient in thi s task. He has been ref erred to as a 
-breathing brick,-(Goldsmith 1961) obviously inferring a very passive 
role. Evidence is presented that the public is rather willing to accept 
changes in the medical care delivery and financing. There are many 
reasons to feel that this containment of medical care costs would 
best be worked out between the patient and his physicians. 
A concept of financing medical care is described in which the 
role of the patient is greatly expanded. It would require his 
participation in decisions about his medical care, with financial 
incentive to choose the most cost effective care. The role of a 
patient's primary physician is discussed and a suggested way of 
altering his reimbursement and incentives is outlined. This partial 
capitation method of reimbursement for the primary care physician, 
when combined with the insurance incentives for the patient, would 
place him in a different, but very crucial relationship with his 
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patients. This would deemphasize the physician's role as a performer 
of procedures# to which our current system gives so much incentive. 
He would be# in addition to a provider of primary care# a teacher# 
financial manager# and counselor to his patients as they respond to 
the built 1n cost-effective incentives of the insurance system. 
Some of the major factors contributing to rising health care 
costs have been viewed with the consideration of the potential 
impact on those factors as a patient# and his primary care physician# 
sought to utilize a unique financing system called Choice-Card. Where 
and in what circumstances would this best be tried? How could it be 
implemented? Does it have potential to help us in our current 
dilemma? Arguments and discussion have been presented of its 
potential benefits. Consistent with our American tradition of free 
choice# we as a SOCiety may be able to discharge our responsibility to 
proyi de access to medi ca 1 care # have control on costs # and still allow 
a maxi mum expression of indi yidua 1 choi ceo 
The emphasis of this concept will encourage the patient to share 
in the risk of cost-containment with his reaping the benefit of wise 
use of his health care voucher. That there will be fixed budgets seems 
to be inevitable. Physicians in general are not accepting of fixed 
budgets# but have become accustomed to dipping into the deep pockets 
of the insurance company# or the goYemment# to provide all of the 
services that they or their patients perceive as possibly helpful. 
Haying enjoyed this relatively unfettered freedom for so long it is 
quite possible that the best way to influence the patient and the 
physician to a posture of dealing effectively with this most difficult 
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problem of medicDl CDre costs is to make thDt fixed budget the 
pDtient"s budget. This may be more acceptable than the fixed budget 
of the fDceless insurDnce compDny .. HMO .. or the government. 
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